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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the problem of order 
through an analysis of individual practices of security. 
Because security is a multi-dimensional issue, no unified 
perspective currently exists to explain security practices. 
Based on my analysis of data from a detailed survey of 137 
residents of a Baton Rouge neighborhood, I argue that there 
are three main dimensions of security and each has a unique 
set of determinants, since individuals are contextually 
situated in their households, neighborhoods, and 
municipalities.
This dissertation examines variables related to 
psychological, stratification, social network, and rational 
choice perspectives. The analysis demonstrates that 
although factors suggested by each of these perspectives 
contribute to an explanation of security, no one factor 
explains security-related behaviors at all levels.
I argue that citizens vary in the types of actions 
they take to provide security because of differential 
levels of trust in different agents to provide the 
necessary services. Some trust their own abilities to 
provide security for themselves, some trust neighborhood 
programs, and some trust the government to provide 
security. Because trust is a key issue in understanding
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
security, I propose that future research on security 
acknowledge the importance of trust. I suggest that part 
of the failure of the rational choice perspective to 
present a unified explanation of security is that it does 
not properly understand self interest. The rational choice 
perspective should acknowledge the relationships between 
trust and security, and trust and order.
Fear of crime is significantly related to individuals' 
personal avoidance measures. Association with neighbors is 
related to taking fewer protectivemeasures in and around 
the home. I offer no explanation of support for 
contributions to the community crime-prevention 
organization. Trust in local government, educational 
attainment, and tax liability explains support for the tax 
millages.
XI
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The Problem
Sociologists have long been concerned with the 
"problem of order." Turner (1985) noted that classical 
theorists dating back to Herbert Spencer were concerned 
with micro processes in society which sustain the 
institutional order and achieve societal equilibrium. The 
problem of order, as classically conceived, deals with the 
question of how diverse interests and actors can be 
reconciled and integrated into a social whole. This 
problem gives rise to questions of social control and 
deviance, the place where abstract social theory meets 
pragmatic questions from the everyday life of individuals. 
In short, che problem of order writ small is the problem of 
security for people.
The central question of this dissertation is: What are 
the dimensions and determinants of security? I introduce 
the concept of security as the need for freedom from 
suffering personal or property damage or loss. Although 
Americans continuously rate security as a primary societal 
need (Miller, Tsemberis, Malia, and Grega, 1980; Farah, 
Barnes, and Heunk, 1979), little work has been done to 
study the rapid growth and change in types of security 
concerns and practices. Various types of security can be
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
purchased. Moore and Trojanowicz (1988) state that "... 
one of the most important privileges one acquires as one 
gains wealth and status in American society is the 
opportunity to leave the fear of crime behind" (p.2). 
Ninety-five percent of Americans take some type of 
preventive security measure (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981}. 
However, although there is uniform agreement on the need 
for security, citizens differ in the way in which they 
address this need.
The social scientific community has also addressed the 
problem of security, but without any unified approach to 
understanding the issue. To begin to fill this gap, I 
first attempt to conceptualize security on a continuum from 
micro to macro.- Decisions on adoption of practices 
related to security are made at the individual/household 
level, neighborhood level, and municipal level. I attempt 
to explore the relationships among these three levels by 
asking whether security practices are complementary or 
substitutional among them.
" There is a great deal of disagreement among social 
scientists in defining micro, meso, and macro units of 
analysis. In her American Sociological Association 
Presidential Address, Joan Huber (1990) noted that the only 
agreement about definitions in micro and macro is that 
micro means small. It must be understood that micro, meso, 
and macro are relative terms and levels of analysis used in 
this study are simply labels attached to areas of different 
geographic scope.
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3This dissertation attempts to achieve a better 
understanding of the relationships among and adoption of 
security practices. Because appropriate levels of security 
and prices that are willing to be paid cannot be clearly 
defined by citizens, collectivities, or government 
officials, security is not provided through an efficient 
market process.
This dissertation investigates influences on 
individual actions related to security. It will be shown 
that there are different influences on practices related to 
micro, meso, and macro levels of security. Adoption of 
practices related to security is influenced by an 
individual's fear of crime, social status, and social 
network context.
In this chapter, the idea of security will be 
explored. I present a three-level approach in which 
individuals may provide, or cooperate with others to 
provide security for themselves, their family members, 
their neighbors, and fellow citizens. Second, I review 
three approaches that have been used to explain security- 
related behaviors: psychological, stratification, and 
social network. Each of these approaches has something to 
offer in explaining security behavior, but each also falls 
short of offering a unified and empirically testable 
explanation of behavior at micro, meso, and macro levels.
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4Next, the current status of rational choice theory is 
reviewed and applied to the provision of security.
Levels of Security
Humans are expected to place their greatest energies 
in fulfilling their most basic needs before they can focus 
on other needs (Maslow, 1954). Inglehart [1911) draws on 
the ideas of Maslow to present security as a highly valued 
need which comes after fulfillment of the most basic 
physiological and sustenance needs.
Part of the lack of a unified understanding of 
security comes from the diverse ways in which security- 
related behaviors have been studied. Protection in and 
around the home has been considered a very high priority 
(Warr and Stafford, 1983) . This form of security has been, 
studied in terms of spatial, temporal, and situational 
avoidance measures {DuBow, McCabe, and Kaplan, 1979), 
individual protective measures such as gun ownership 
(Wright, Rossi, and Daly, 1983), and household measures 
such as installing alarm systems or deadbolt locks (Skogan 
and Maxfield, 1981; Lavrakas et al., 1981; DuBow et al., 
1979).
Most communities monitor and exclude "outsiders" 
through informal processes (Suttles, 1968; 1972). Some
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
5neighborhoods may also organize formally to watch 
neighbors' homes and look out for "suspicious activities" 
(Lindsay and McGillis, 1986; Lewis, Grant, and Rosenbaum, 
1988; Rosenbaum, 1987; Podolefsky and DuBow, 1981). Other 
communities collect money to hire supplemental policing 
(private security guards or extra-duty police or deputies).
Law enforcement agencies provide services used by all 
citizens in the metropolitan area. Though individuals must 
comply with the local laws and do not influence directly 
the local criminal justice agents, citizens are given a 
voice in government through electing representatives and 
voting for or against tax referenda that may affect the 
budget of the criminal justice system.-
This dissertation introduces the idea of categorizing 
these dimensions into micro-level measures that take place 
in and around the home, meso-level measures that take place
- Louisiana politics have a long history of populism and of 
offering a very low tax burden for medium to lower income 
residents. One popular law which keeps property taxes low 
is the Homestead Exemption, under which any residence which 
is assessed at or below $ 75,000 is exempt from all parish 
property taxes. This exemption, together with property tax 
rates creates a unique tax structure. Of the 100 largest 
metropolitan areas in the United States, Baton Rouge had 
the lowest property tax assessment for comparable homes.
The Baton Rouge tax rate was approximately one-fifteenth 
that of the area with the highest tax liability (Long 
Island, New York) and one-sixth that of the national median 
(Smith, 1993) .
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around the neighborhood, and macro-level measures that are 
provided by the municipal government.- 
Micro-Level Security
Most social scientific research on security practices 
has been carried out at the household level (DuBow, McCabe, 
and Kaplan, 1979; Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garofalo, 
1978). Some of this research emphasis is based upon the 
belief that individuals are most concerned about defending 
their own homes (Warr and Stafford, 1983). Most studies 
have focused on the direct relationship between fear of 
crime’ and various precautionary and protective measures 
that are affected indirectly by ascribed and achieved 
characteristics such as socioeconomic status, age, and sex 
(DuBow et al., 1979; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Warr, 1990; 
Warr and Stafford, 1983) .
■ Security is also a matter for larger political units such 
as nations, but the study of international security calls 
for a different approach. I will not address international 
security in this dissertation.
’ Fear of crime captures both perceived risk of being a 
victim and severity of offense. Warr and Stafford (1983) 
showed that individuals' highest fear was for property 
offenses. Respondents were more likely to be afraid of 
having their homes burgled while they are away than at 
home. While violent crime has more severe consequences, 
people are significantly more likely to become victims of 
property crime. Perceived risk plays a part in fear. Warr 
(1990) found that altruistic fear leads to an increased 
likelihood of gun ownership, but does not lead to a greater 
likelihood of taking other household level security 
precautions (Warr, 1990) . This study focuses primarily on 
the respondents' personal fear of crime.
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7At the personal household (micro) level, several types 
of security precautions can be taken. People participate 
in such avoidance behaviors as: avoiding going out alone or 
at night, avoiding certain places in the city, and refusing 
to answer the door. Individual/household protective 
actions may include: installing security fences or alarms, 
installing door locks and chains, installing window locks, 
installing outdoor lighting, purchasing a dog for 
protection, owning a gun for protection, and leaving 
lights, televisions, or radios on when they go out.
Meso- and Macro-Level Security
Hunter (1985) stated that "to focus solely upon the 
household, the dwelling, or similar micro-level physical 
units is to miss this important, more expansive spatial 
characteristic of the private social order... private order 
is to be studied as an interaction between private and 
public orders" (p.235). Understanding individual-level 
security practices provides only a partial explanation of 
the other kinds of practices related to security. At the 
meso and macro levels we deal with a public goods problem. 
Still, security at meso and macro levels may be examined in 
terms of the ways that individuals contribute to collective 
enterprises.
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8At the neighborhood (meso) level, organizations often 
carry out the business of governing and providing 
collective services (Crenson, 1983). As with some forms of 
household protection, individuals can participate in 
security measures that cost little, such as watching 
neighbors' homes for suspicious activities. More 
important, neighborhoods organize to form neighborhood 
groups that are supported or funded through residents' 
contributions. These may provide private patrols or 
residents themselves may actively protect the community 
through citizen watches and patrols.
At the municipal (macro) level, the state provides a 
justice system with police, courts, and prisons. Although 
taxpayers are not given a choice of whether or not they 
will pay taxes, they do have a voice in governmental 
decisions through such mechanisms as tax referenda (Hahn 
and Kamieniecki, 1987). The state provides a criminal 
justice system with laws and police. Because the 
government is the primary provider of public goods, 
influencing the government is essential in all collective 
consumption issues. Both the benefit and cost of policing 
are shared by all taxpaying citizens, with several 
organized interests competing for public benefits 
(Castells, 1977, 1983; Rich, 1982a, 1982b) and the
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9redistribution of the tax burden (Peterson, 1981; Lo,
1990; Hahn and Kamieneki, 1987).
Although security is a nearly universally valued good, 
taking action at one level has no necessary or obvious 
relation with taking actions at other levels. I will argue 
that no one single factor explains participation in 
security behaviors at all levels, and that influences on 
support for one type of security do not predict support at 
other levels. Meso and macro levels of security differ 
from the individual level because they involve goods made 
available through collective rather than individual action. 
Meso and macro issues also differ in the types and amounts 
of legitimate formal coercion that can be used by the 
collectivity.
The Free Rider Problem
For many years, social scientists have been 
preoccupied with the free rider problem for public goods. 
Coleman (1990a) defines this problem in two parts: first, 
many goods cannot be provided without a collective 
contribution and second, individuals have no incentive to 
contribute to the provision of collective goods unless they 
are sanctioned by the collective. By definition, a public 
good is one whose benefits are non-excludable; because 
selective incentives are in many cases unavailable in
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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public goods, all individuals receive the benefit. Also, 
it is clear that some people benefit more than others.
Some people receive latent rewards, or make use of the 
benefit more than others.
One of the primary questions that rational choice 
theory must address is "to what extent will people 
contribute to public goods?" One rational choice 
explanation is that people base their decisions on their 
overall costs and benefits (Homans, 1951; Coleman, 1990a; 
Blau, 1954). Olson (1955) pointed out that through a 
simple cost-benefit analysis, the most rational action for 
individuals is not to contribute and to simply receive the 
benefit cost-free rather than contributing to the costs of 
public goods, hence the term "free rider." If the good is 
provided by the collective, individuals may be able to 
receive the service without contributing. This action 
maximizes their "profit," and seems to encourage free 
riding. Free riding appears to pay off. Of course, if a 
significant number of community members did not contribute, 
no public good would ever be provided.
I argue that the problem of public goods differs at 
meso and macro levels. At the meso level, communities 
offer a different set of incentives and sanctions for 
participation and free riding than those offered at the 
macro level. At the meso level, many communities lack
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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formal sanctioning structures but have different capacities 
to sanction members informally. At the macro level, the 
state offers citizens the right to vote and to voice 
opinions on political issues, but requires compliance with 
laws.
Various explanations of public goods provision have 
been provided. Hechter (1987) argues that individual 
contributions to groups are made because members are 
frequently motivated by "benefitting when the group 
benefits." Therefore, understanding group solidarity is 
important to understanding the provision of public goods. 
Coleman (1990a) argued that individuals receive "psychic 
benefits" when their actions are similar to those of their 
peers.
Recent literature has documented the growth of 
collective, non-governmental organizations designed to 
reduce crime (Podolefsky and DuBow, 1981; Lewis, Grant, and 
Rosenbaum, 1988). Rich (1980, p.571) explained the 
production of security at the neighborhood level and the 
free rider problem that this kind of collective action 
faces :
No single citizen is likely to be able to reduce 
crime in a neighborhood by individual effort. If 
a number of residents cooperate in a successful 
crime prevention program, however, all residents 
will reap the benefit of the collective good 
produced by their efforts (a reduced risk of
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victimization) regardless of whether or not they 
took part in the program.
I will address the problem of security as both an 
individual action and collective goods issue. Adoption of 
security practices and support for security measures is 
influenced through a complex process of individual need 
fulfillment and social forces.
Approaches to Understanding Security
In this second section, I outline three approaches 
that have been used to explain human behavior. These 
approaches are not mutually exclusive and empirical support 
for one approach is not necessarily inconsistent with 
support for others. Each approach attempts to explain 
security behaviors at the micro, meso, and macro levels. 
Each partially succeeds and partially fails in accounting 
for the problem of understanding security provision.
The Psychological Approach
The psychological approach assumes that individuals 
act in their own self interest, often disregarding the 
welfare of others. Social order takes place through an 
"invisible hand" in which goods valued by the individual 
aid society and goods valued by society aid individuals. 
Because individuals act in their own self-interest, 
regardless of the surrounding circumstances, there is no 
need to study common values or patterns of relations with
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others in order to understand their actions. Societal 
action is the aggregate of all individual actions.
The psychological approach accounts for the adoption 
of security behavior by arguing that these actions promote 
individual psychological well being. The study of fear of 
crime presents a paradox in that those most fearful are 
often the least likely to be victimized (Lewis and Salem, 
1985; DuBow et al., 1979). The dependent dimension in this 
study is not fear, but rather actions taken to provide 
security. But there is a link between these two phenomena: 
Fear motivates individuals to take precautionary behaviors 
that lower their risk of becoming crime victims (Moore and 
Trojanowicz, 1988). Those with the highest levels of 
personal fear are most likely to take avoidance behaviors 
(Warr, 1984; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981).
However, research on protective actions (specifically, 
gun ownership) has produced mixed findings. Wright, Rossi, 
and Daly (1983), and Delmas and Bankston (1993) found no 
relationship between fear of crime and gun ownership. But 
Smith and Uchida (1988) and Warr (1992) found a significant 
relationship between fear of crime and purchasing a gun for 
protection.= Studies of the relationship between fear of 
crime and adoption of other types of protective measures
= Warr (1992) found no relationship between fear for others 
and protective measures, except for gun ownership.
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have also produced mixed findings (DuBow, McCabe, and 
Kaplan, 1979) .
Attitudes such as trust in local government and racial 
beliefs influence human behavior, especially at the 
political level (Key, 1949; Carmines and Stimson, 1989). 
However, until recently, social scientific literature has 
generally neglected the linkage between governmental trust 
and electoral support for crime issues, and the race-crime- 
electoral behavior relationship.
Criticism of the Psychological Approach
One major deficiency of the psychological perspective 
is that it provides an explanation of security measures 
only at the household (micro) level. Household-level 
security is only one aspect of the general puzzle of how 
people address their security concerns. At the meso and 
macro levels we deal with a public goods problem. From 
time to time, some people defy what appears to be their own 
best interest, refrain from free riding, and act in an 
altruistic manner. Communities most fearful of crime are 
not more likely to take on several types of neighborhood- 
level security measures (Lavrakas et al., 1981), nor are 
they more likely to vote for higher taxes to expand the 
criminal justice system (Hahn and Kamieniecki, 1987) . 
Attitudes do affect electoral behavior, but discovering the 
most salient attitudes opens up a new series of debates.
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The Stratification Approach
Stratification theory has been used as a response to 
the problem of social order. Cultural distinctions and 
environmental conditions create opportunities and 
constraints for actors' behavior. Ascribed and achieved 
statuses affect individuals' access to resources, and also 
impose constraints on social action.
Two statuses that are believed to affect citizen's 
adoption of security measures are socioeconomic status 
(Lavrakas et al, 1981) and life course stage (Knoke and 
Thomson, 1977} . Individuals in these situations are 
expected to develop certain beliefs and act in certain 
ways.
Marx claimed that patterns of stratification lead to 
formation of solidary groups forming a collective class 
conscience that expresses constraint. People residing in 
individual neighborhoods are likely to share similar 
socioeconomic status. The combination of sharing 
residential location and social class has led to 
expectations that these people have similar interests on a 
number of issues (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Lo, 1990).
Crime is a political issue in the sense that the issue 
has symbolic and instrumental aspects. Symbolic politics 
is concerned with status and public affirmations that a 
particular group is right or morally correct (Gusfield,
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1963). Class-based groups not only share common interests, 
but also form they form coalitions that struggle against 
outgroup members for the control and benefits of public 
resources (Castells, 1977). Because public goods lead to 
competition for resources, race and socioeconomic status 
have been noted as key factors in electoral politics 
dealing with the distribution of resources (Carmines and 
Stimson, 1989). Hahn and Kamienecki express the view that 
"while high status voters may be willing to utilize their 
resources to support local services in the communities in 
which they live, they apparently are not prepared to 
subsidize the disadvantaged" (1987, p.124).
Race is a status variable. Research has shown that 
fear of crime decreases for whites as their level of 
neighborhood racial segregation increases. Liska,
Lawrence, and Sanchirico (1982) explain this relationship 
by noting crime between culturally dissimilar people is 
more threatening and fear-producing than crime between 
culturally similar people. It is associated with greater 
uncertainty, unpredictability, and danger than intraracial 
crime. Therefore, people pay a premium to live in all 
white neighborhoods and avoid interaction with blacks 
(Smith, 1982).
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Criticism of the Stratification Approach
The stratification approach has been criticized on 
three primary grounds. First of all, although status may 
explain why actors share similar constraints, some actors 
deviate from expected behaviors. Many theorists assume 
similar constraints for all actors in a particular group, 
but some actors facing similar structural constraints, with 
similar access to information, develop different attitudes 
and behavior. Another criticism of stratification analysis 
is that if shared structural conditions lead to behavior, 
why does collective action not occur more often? Free 
riders still exist even though actors face similar 
constraints within the structure. A third criticism is 
that models of collective action often take constraints as 
fixed for all actors in empirical settings (Ostrum, 1990). 
The stratification approach does not account for different 
values among all actors in the system and aggregates with 
similar characteristics often act differentially. For 
example, there is a great deal of variability in the 
actions of white middle class American groups.
The Social Network Approach
The concept of social structure separates sociology 
from other fields of behavioral analysis (Wellman and 
Berkowitz, 1988) . The social network approach to 
structure was created as a response to the ideas in basic
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psychological and economic theories that society is the 
product of actors behaving in their own self interest. 
Social networks may be analyzed in order to understand how 
actors choices and constraints grow out of and are 
influenced by relations with others.
Earlier concepts of norm-driven behavior and 
"internalization of norms" offered little explanatory 
power. Social network analysts measure the structure of 
social networks and use that structure, rather than the 
internalized drives and motivations of individuals, to 
explain social action. Proponents of this perspective 
argue that the structure of social networks both 
facilitates and constrains social action. Social structure 
also affects the formation of social networks. Demographic 
and social structures affect individuals' opportunities for 
individuals to develop relationships with others (Blau,
1977; McPherson, 1981) . For example, network structure has 
been shown to vary by such characteristics as gender 
{Moore, 1990) , race (Marsden, 1977), and marital status 
(Hurlbert and Acock, 1989).
The social network approach to the problem of security 
stresses that the characteristics of the social network in 
which an actor is embedded affect the types of security 
measures that he or she takes. Those actors who have 
denser networks are more likely to be influenced by their
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close associates and will be more likely to adopt the 
structurally prescribed behavior. Individuals interacting 
most frequently with neighbors are more likely to be 
influenced through conversations and interaction (Coleman, 
1990a). They face a potential for greater social pressure 
(subject themselves to meaningful sanctions) to act in the 
culturally proscribed and prescribed manners (Hechter,
1987). At the meso and macro levels, actors possessing 
allegiance to a group (Coleman, 1990a; Coleman, Katz, and 
Menzel, 1966) or sharing equivalent positions in society's 
structure (Burt, 1987) are expected to participate in more 
"pro-group" behavior.
Granovetter's (1962) "strength of weak ties" thesis 
argues that in areas which have higher proportion of weak 
ties (e.g. friends of friends, acquaintances) rather than 
strong ties (e.g. close friends, relatives), information 
will diffuse more rapidly. This argument may point to a 
mechanism that explains why some neighborhoods take 
security actions and others fail to do so; Some residents 
may not know about the existence of neighborhood-level 
security actions. Other residents may not believe that the 
neighborhood-level actions provide sufficient benefits to 
justify the cost of their individual contributions.
Comparing isolates and non-isolates in a system, 
Coleman, Katz, and Menzel (1966) showed that ideas are
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adopted by actors who are more embedded in the social 
system. Balance theory (Heider, 1958; Newcomb, 1961) would 
predict that associates are likely to hold similar 
attitudes. If A, B, and C are actors in a structure, and A 
and B support an issue, then C is highly likely to support 
the same issue. This approach suggests there will be an 
effect of community integration on household security 
measures even though these decisions are personal and are 
made privately.
Another way that social networks may affect action 
indirectly comes about in explaining the psychological 
perspective. Integration in a social network affects fear 
of victimization (Warr, 1990; Hunter and Baumer, 1982}.
The presence of others can be assuring, or alternatively 
can cause greater levels of fear and the key to 
understanding reactions to others is familiarity (Warr,
1990; Goffman, 1971) . Cities are populated by strangers 
(Wirth, 1938; Lofland, 1973) and social integration reduces 
fear by reducing the proportion of strangers people 
interact with in everyday life and reducing the strangeness 
of routine life in the neighborhood (Hunter and Baumer,
1982). Another argument for the indirect effects of social 
networks derives from their influence on attitude formation 
(Newcomb, 1961; Straits, 1990).
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Criticism of the Social Network Approach
The social network perspective has been subject to 
criticism. The primary critique of social network theory 
is that it is too purely structural and ignores the content 
of ties, without which it is difficult to predict anything 
(Kilburn, 1992) .
Social network theorists also have a problem in 
explaining the influence of levels of integration. Though 
numerous studies have shown that people act in a similar 
manner to others in their social network (Homans, 1950; 
Newcomb, 1961; Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, 1966), the 
process influencing these behaviors is subject to debate. 
Are individuals more likely to act like the people they are 
close to or are they more likely to act like people with 
whom they share similar status? Homans (1950), and 
Coleman (1990a) argue that socializing bonds are 
influential in diffusing information and influence in 
proscribing and prescribing appropriate actions. Burt 
(1987) showed that actors sharing a frame of reference with 
those having similar patterns of relations within the 
social structure (structural equivalence) are likely to act 
in a similar manner to those people significantly more than 
actors tied together by socializing bonds.
The content of ties differ with individuals in various 
types of networks. Not only do characteristics of networks
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differ among people, each individual interacts among 
diverse types of networks on an everyday basis. Current 
social network theory does offer an explanation of power 
and influence in networks.
The Rational Choice Approach
The psychological, stratification, and social network 
approaches have failed to explain the free rider problem.
I attempt to present a modified rational choice theory as 
an empirically testable approach to the social phenomenon 
of security that applies to the micro, meso, and macro 
levels. This theory addresses all three of Coleman's 
(1990a, p.11) components of systemic behavior theory:
a) A set of roles that players take on, each role 
defining the interests or goals of the player.
b) Rules about the kinds of actions that are 
allowable for players in each role, as well as 
about the order of play.
c) Rules specifying the consequences that each 
player's action has for other players in the 
game.
Rational choice theory borrows from all three of the 
previously mentioned perspectives. From the psychological 
perspective, rational choice uses the concept of the value 
of the private or public good. From the stratification 
perspective, rational choice theory looks at similarly 
situated actors sharing the development of norms, 
interests, and values. Rational choice theory uses the
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social network perspective to explain the role of 
sanctioning ability of others in influencing participation 
in collective actions and the internalization of norms.
James Coleman's (1990a) Foundations of Social Theory 
outlines a version of rational choice theory that seeks to 
account for the functioning of a social system. Coleman's 
aim for rational choice theory is not to eliminate other 
environmental and structural influences as explanations but 
instead to account for behaviors they fail to explain. 
Rational choice theory explains how a norm arises and the 
tvpe and effectiveness of sanctions that enforce the norm. 
The task is to explain social phenomena, not the behavior 
of individuals: "A norm is a property of a social system,
not an action within it" (Coleman, 1990b, p.35). Coleman's 
theory is one of purposive action in which actors seek 
maximization of utility under constraints of social 
context: "We say that we understand the 'reasons' why the
person acted in a certain way, implying that we understand 
the intended goal and how the actions were seen by the 
actor to contribute to that goal" (Coleman, 1990a; p.13).
Rational choice theory has traditionally been vexed 
with the problem of explaining institutional genesis® 
(Hechter, Opp, Wippler, 1990). Rational choice theory can
Coleman defines institutional genesis as the creation and
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be extended to explain security provision as a product of 
the interaction between actors' needs to obtain welfare and 
deference goods. Welfare goods are directly provided 
material goods, while deference goods are indirectly 
provided as personal gratification (Lasswell and Kaplan, 
1950).
Rational choice theory can be applied to the adoption 
of individual-level security behaviors. Exchange does not 
take place in a vacuum. Although the value of the good is 
an important incentive for action, social exchange analysis 
focuses on alters' conduct and too frequently ignores ego's 
personal traits (Blau, 1964). Relationships are dynamic 
and interactive. The network defines normative behavior 
that influences actions and constitutes a structural 
constraint by placing an individual in an environment with 
a relatively small set of options (Jankowski, 1992).
Although the theoretical problem is explaining action 
and outcomes in a social system, Coleman's theory is based 
on an individual-level theory of action. Whereas some may 
criticize individual level analysis of groups form because 
individuals cannot efficiently achieve their own ends by 
themselves (Smith, 1981 {1786}; deToqueville, 1956 {1835}).
Because free riding appears to be a rational action, 
Coleman (1990a) argues that we are faced with two problems. 
The first-order public good problem comes about when each
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individual will benefit only from the contribution of 
others. The second-order public good problem is that 
sanctioning free riders may be costly to the collective 
(Heckathorn, 1989). Both norm development and norm 
maintenance require that individuals in a system legitimate 
and internalize norms. The first-order good problem is 
solved from either individuals valuing the good or from 
some outside threat.
Coleman (1990a) and Hechter (1987) suggest that the 
free rider problem can be understood in terms of 
solidarity. Relationships of reciprocity discourage 
defection from contributing to a good. Actors more 
enmeshed in the community are more likely to comply with 
collective rules because they are the most likely to lose 
something in the sanctioning process. Those embedded in 
the system are more likely to internalize norms join with 
like-minded individuals in order to produce the good.
From a systemic perspective, effective norms must be 
enforced by sanctions. Legitimacy is a necessary condition 
for providing a consistent explanation of behavioral 
influence. In becoming dependent on a collective, people 
give others legitimacy to sanction their own behavior. At 
first this may not seem like a rational act, but by giving 
up this right to control one's own behavior, a person 
affiliates with a legitimated collective with power over
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its members. Those observing norms receive a right to 
impose sanctions on norm violators, while those not 
observing the norm have less power in imposing those norms 
on others. Rational egoists choose to belong to a group 
because they are dependent on other members (Thibaut and 
Kelley, 1959) . Coleman summarized this by stating: "If a 
person comes to identify with a socializing agent, that is, 
to see his interests as identical to those of the agent, 
then the claim by the agent of a right to control will be 
seen as legitimate, because it is a claim deriving from 
interests the person sees as his own" (1990a, p. 289) .
Coleman expands rational choice theory to explain the 
free rider problem for individual behavior within macro­
level actions. He acknowledges that voting behavior seems 
to be a difficult problem for rational choice theorists. 
Even in small local elections, one vote is not likely to 
affect the outcome. Thus, even though the cost of voting 
is minimal in time and effort, the manifest reward is 
arguably negligible. Coleman explains that "psychic 
benefits" are offered to voters through acting in a manner 
similar to their reference group.
Hechter (1987) stresses visibility of actions in 
understanding the free rider problem. In order for groups 
to control the behavior of members, the targeted behaviors
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must be monitored and the group must have the right to 
sanction individual actors. Monitoring capacity depends on 
the degree to which it possesses information about 
individual compliance with corporate rules or obligations. 
In sanctioning group members^ the group must be able to 
encourage compliance and/or discourage deviance from group 
norms.
Group size affects both the monitoring and sanctioning 
capacity of the group. Monitoring behavior has variable 
costs, dependent on the visibility of the behavior and the 
size of the group. Less valuable goods and private 
behaviors are less visible and create more sanctioning 
costs. This follows modernization theories, in which 
individuals are taken from their web of "gemeinschaft" 
(cohesive, intimate) relationships and placed into less 
intricate "gesellschaft" (disengaged, impersonal) 
relationships (Toennies, 1957). It could be argued that 
modernization leads to a reduction in local intimacy. 
Individuals face greater obligations in a gemeinschaft 
relationship than they do in dealing with the faceless 
members of the gesellschaft population. Members of a large 
group are more likely to be able to act in anonymity, so 
sanctioning costs may be high, requiring coercion that is 
legitimized by a larger aggregate. Hechter (1987) proposed 
that those with closer ties to the community are more
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dependent on the group, and this leads to greater group 
obligations.
At the macro level, Hechter claims that formal 
controls are developed for legitimated coercion, such as a 
municipal criminal justice system. As for applying the 
free rider argument to voting behavior, this solidarity 
explanation must assume internalization of a belief system 
that leads to the altruistic behavior of going to the polls 
and casting a ballot. This theory neglects the value of 
the good: Those valuing the good are expected to be more
compliant with the group's expectations. Individuals value 
goods differently. When people pay the same amount of 
money for the same service but value the service 
differently, one achieves higher profit than the other. 
Summary
The problem of order writ small is the problem of 
security. Security can be viewed at three discrete levels: 
the household or micro level, the neighborhood or meso 
level, and the municipal or macro level. Although the 
relationships between levels are clearly an important 
sociological problem, sociologists have been slow to 
address the issue. Although patterns of collective action 
enhance or reduce security at all levels, individual 
actors' support for one level of security is not
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necessarily an accurate predictor of support at another 
level. The public goods problem makes security at meso and 
macro levels a different question than that of individual 
adoption. Meso and macro levels of security differ because 
residents of neighborhoods differ in the cost they are 
willing to bear to obtain the public good as well as the 
benefits they receive from the public good. Initially, 
free riding appears to be a rational action.
I have presented three approaches that have been used 
to understand the problem of security provision but fail to 
provide an adequate solution to the problem of security, 
primarily because of their failure to address the 
implications of the free rider problem. The psychological 
approach is advantageous because it offers a simple 
explanation of the problem: Fear of victimization causes
actors to take a variety of individual precautions.
However, the psychological approach does not account for 
why individuals with the same level of fear may contribute 
differently to collective action.
The stratification approach offers the idea that 
personal traits such as socioeconomic status, age, and race 
are the primary influences on certain types of action 
related to security concerns. People in different social 
positions defined by status characteristics (e.g. stages of 
the life course or different social classes) have
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distinctive interests and means to address problems. A 
shortcoming of this approach is that many areas with 
similar status characteristics have the potential to act a 
certain way but do not. Similar groups may differ in 
levels of altruism and free riding (Hechter, 1987).
The social network approach proposes that the primary 
determinants of behavior are patterns of relationships. 
People associating with like others will participate in 
similar types of behavior at all levels of security.
Though the concept of rootedness has been successful in 
predicting contributions to public goods, the social 
network approach does not address differences between 
levels. Rootedness in a neighborhood may actually lead to 
an organized neighborhood movement that opposes 
contributions to a municipal-level good. The linkage 
between integration in the community social network and the 
adoption of similar household actions remains unclear.
The rational choice approach addresses security 
practices at all three levels, accounting for private and 
public goods. Rational choice accounts for micro-level 
security by examining the value of the good and psychic 
benefits offered through action that follows prescribed 
norms. Rational choice also proposes a solution to the 
free rider problem by mapping out influence in the social 
network.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
3 1
In the next chapter, hypotheses derived from 
psychological, stratification, social network, and rational 
choice approaches will be developed. I will describe a 
single neighborhood in Baton Rouge as a strategic research 
context in which to test hypotheses on security practices 
in a stable, bounded system of homogeneous actors. This 
chapter uses census data, personal interviews, and 
newspaper reports to describe the social context, political 
environment, and cultural history of one particular 
neighborhood, focusing on the need and provision of 
security services at all levels. A survey of 137 residents 
of the neighborhood I will call "Midtown" provides data to 
test empirically each approach to understanding the problem 
of security.
Chapter three tests these hypotheses using 
multivariate analytical techniques. First, I test the 
congruence among support for security measures at the 
micro, meso, and macro levels. Then, I test the 
significance of factors deemed important in each 
theoretical approach to predicting provision of each level 
of security.
Chapter four discusses the findings presented in 
chapter three. I address the central finding that each 
dimension of security has a unique set of determinants. 
Because of this, no single variable or combination of
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
3 2
variables is related directly to participation in or 
support for household, neighborhood, and municipal security 
measures. I argue that the concept of trust needs to be 
incorporated or central to the study of security in order 
to understand its micro, meso, and macro dimensions.
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CHAPTER 2. SECURITY-RELATED HYPOTHESES 
Introduction
This chapter outlines hypotheses on the relations 
among and determinant of security practices at various 
levels. First, I present hypotheses on the relationships 
among levels of security. Next, I present hypotheses on 
the adoption of or support for security measures at 
household, neighborhood, and civic levels. This will be 
accomplished using each of the psychological, 
stratification, social network, and rational choice 
perspectives. Finally, I describe the research site, data, 
and variables used to test the hypotheses.
Individual responses to crime are hotly debated issues 
in governmental policy. A platform addressing citizens' 
rights to own handguns for personal protection contributed 
to electoral support for Louisiana's newly elected Governor 
Mike Foster. Security companies that supply guards and 
alarm systems are growth industries in the United States.
Crime is a social problem that requires a collective 
response. Though individuals may be able to protect 
themselves and prevent some crimes, for thousands of years 
societies have had criminal justice systems employing 
specialists. However, people often fall into the trap of 
collective goods, in which everyone believes that the good
33
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is of benefit but not everyone is willing to contribute to 
its provision.
Just as free riding may occur in a neighborhood, there 
is concern that neighborhoods may contribute to private 
provision of services (such as security) to the exclusion 
of support for governmental services that are shared with 
other citizens in the municipality (McKenzie, 1994; Reich,
1991). Although all citizens pay taxes and receive the 
benefits of protection by the government's criminal justice 
system, citizens do have a voice in government that 
influences their tax liability and governmental service 
delivery. The growing number of affluent neighborhoods 
providing private security services leads to the question: 
"Does private government lead to a withdrawal of support 
for municipal governments?"
Household, Community, and Municipal Level Hypotheses
In the last chapter, I introduced the idea that 
security may be viewed within a three-level framework: the 
household level, the neighborhood level, and the municipal 
level. However, the outstanding question that has been 
addressed by no prior study is whether security practices 
at these various levels tend to be substitutional or 
complementary. If security-related behaviors are 
predominantly a substitutional phenomenon, residents taking
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one set of measures are less likely to support other types 
of security measures. For example, those residents taking 
actions in and around their home may be less likely to 
support contributions for private duty patrolling or 
supplementing the citywide police force. Conversely, those 
contributing to the neighborhood patrol and city police may 
be less inclined to take extra measures in and around their 
homes.
However, the alternative argument is that security are 
complementary phenomena, with residents who take more 
security measures in and around the home being more likely 
to support contributions for private-duty patrolling to 
supplement the citywide police force. This might be the 
case if security is more highly valued by some individuals, 
who are then motivated to invest in diverse security 
measures. Weapons purchases (McDowall and Loftin, 1983) 
and neighborhood association formation may begin as a 
response to the perceived lack of police efficacy. When 
individuals take action at the household level, they are 
less likely to want to spend money and energy supporting 
other levels of security. However, because defense of 
one's own home and the area around it is viewed as a top 
priority (Warr and Stafford, 1983), I expect to find a 
strong positive relationship between household security 
measures and participation in neighborhood associations.
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H._. Those taking a larger number of household 
security measures will be more likely to join 
neighborhood associations promoting security.
I expect to find support for the thesis that household
and civic-level security support are essentially
constituted as private behaviors that are not susceptible
to sanctions from other members of the community.
Neighborhood order differs from the individual and public
orders in that the actors are not dealing with "a world of
strangers" (Hunter, 1985; Lofland, 1973; Fischer, 1984).
Although residents of a given geographic area are subject
to similar socialization pressures (Shevky and Bell, 1955;
Festinger, Schacter, and Back, 1950), community influence
is exerted only on behaviors that can be publicly
sanctioned. Because voting is a private action, often kept
secret among close friends (Laumann, 1973), household and
civic behaviors are private and are less likely to be
influenced by network members.
H. : Support for household security measures will 
be positively related to support for civic-level 
security measures.
In the context of neighborhood crime prevention, 
actors behave in a less anonymous public manner.
"Community coercion" influences participation regardless of 
personal support for extra-duty patrolling.' Due to its
In one study, police patrolling was not found to 
significantly reduce crime levels, nor did it reduce fear
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confidential nature, voting is a private act. Moreover,
paying a fee for neighborhood patrolling in addition to
paying taxes for a police department leads to the dilemma
of "double taxation" (Reich, 1991). Residents paying for
community patrolling may be satisfied with their level of
protection for their home and family. However, some people
are not interested in contributing to public goods at
either the neighborhood or the municipal level. Others may
contribute to all types of security because they value the
feeling of safety. These cross-pressures lead to various
configurations of support for or opposition to additional
taxes. Therefore, I expect to find no relationship between
participation in neighborhood-level security measures and
support for civic- level measures.
H: : Membership in the neighborhood association 
will not be significantly related to electoral 
support for civic-level security measures.
Psychological Hypotheses
In this section, the expected relationship between
fear of crime and security measures is discussed as the
focal point for understanding individual actions related to
security provision. In addressing security at the
household (micro) level, several types of precautions can
of crime, attitudes toward police, or the number of 
preventive measures taken. This may mean that joining 
neighborhood associations has results other than reducing 
fear of crime (Kelling et al, 1974).
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be taken which have been shown to decrease victimization 
levels for some types of crime (Miethe, 1991).
The problem of security extends beyond actual 
victimization. The psychological perspective suggests that 
people taking measures related to security may be seeking 
to reduce their fear of crime. Although actual 
victimization affects directly only a small percentage of 
the population, nearly everyone alters their lifestyle to 
some degree out of fear of victimization. Spatial and 
temporal avoidance are among the most common responses to 
fear of crime (DuBcw et al, 1979; Skogan and Maxfield,
1981). Low-cost avoidance behaviors include: avoiding 
going out alone or at night, avoiding certain places in the 
city, and refusing to answer the door. However, protective 
actions are technical in nature, requiring modification of 
the household environment such as: installing security 
fences or alarms, door locks and chains, window locks, or 
outdoor lighting; purchasing a dog for protection; and 
owning a gun (DuBow et al, 1979; Skogan and Maxfield,
1981).
Skogan (1977) and Hindelang et al. (1978) argue that 
individuals who are most fearful should be the most likely 
to take security measures. However, empirical research has 
shown that this relationship is not that simple: Those
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with the highest levels of personal fear are most likely to 
take on avoidance behaviors (Warr, 1984; Skogan and 
Maxfield, 1981). Research on protective actions 
(specifically, the study of gun ownership) has produced 
mixed findings (DuBow, McCabe, and Kaplan, 1979; Wright et 
al., 1983) .
Fear of becoming a victim does lead to the adoption of 
protective actions. Females and the elderly have the 
highest levels of fear of crime because they are more 
likely to view themselves as vulnerable, and less likely to 
be able to defend themselves (Warr, 1984; Hindelang, 
Gottfredson, and Garofalo, 1978). I hypothesize that those 
most afraid of being victimized are more likely to take 
avoidance and protective measures.
Fear of crime will be strongly and 
positively related to the number of avoidance 
measures taken.
Hjo: Fear of crime will be weakly and positively 
related to the number of protective behaviors 
taken.
There should be differences between members and non­
members of neighborhood associations. Residents may differ 
in their assessment of security needs and may also have 
different beliefs about the efficacy of the association. 
Podolefsky and DuBow (1981) studied differences between 
members and non-members of neighborhood crime prevention 
groups. They found no difference between the two groups in
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perceptions of crime, neighborhood conditions, or the 
efficacy of collective crime prevention activities. In 
their study of voluntary block association membership. Rich 
and Wandersman (1983) showed that psychological factors 
such as feelings of control over one's life, personal 
satisfaction, and political cynicism were unrelated to 
membership.
Hç: Fear of crime will not be significantly
related to neighborhood association membership.
Because the government is the primary distributor of 
public goods, influencing the government is essential in 
all collective consumption issues. Because the police have 
been viewed as bearing primary responsibility for deterring 
crime, the public's fear of crime may work to the benefit 
of the police when asking for more resources (Moore and 
Trojanowicz, 1988) . The state has legitimated coercion; 
therefore, all citizens must pay taxes and can only voice 
their support or opposition to governmental services 
(Hirschman, 1970). This voice is articulated through the 
electoral process and opinion polls, but the former has a 
direct impact on the level of police resources that will be 
provided. I predict that those most fearful are most 
likely to support the idea of paying a premium for extra 
protection :
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Those most fearful of crime will be more 
likely to support tax referenda to provide 
supplemental funding for the criminal justice 
system.
Because public goods do lead to competition for
resources, race has been noted as a key factor in electoral
politics dealing with the distribution of resources
(Carmines and Stimson, 1989). Citizens do not vote
directly on racial issues, but there is a tendency for
white citizens (especially in the South) to identify
themselves as having shared interests that are defined by a
perceived conflict with the interests of blacks (Davidson,
1972). Tax referenda issues may be especially salient in
racially segregated neighborhoods, with white middle-class
residents viewing their extra tax dollars paying for extra
policing in high crime (or black) neighborhoods.
H-g: Those residents with stronger anti-black 
beliefs will be more likely to vote against law 
enforcement tax referenda.
Conservative political ideology is often believed to 
be related to anti-tax sentiment. Even though 
conservatives are often believed to be more concerned with 
law and order political issues, they also are more likely 
to question the way governmental funds are allocated, with 
the implication that the government spends enough money on 
crime but does not spend it wisely.
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: Residents with more conservative political 
ideologies will be more likely to vote against 
the tax referenda.
Stratification Hypotheses
Ascribed and achieved social statuses may influence 
individual decisions to adopt specific practices related to 
security. Variables such as being married, owning a home, 
and having higher incomes have been shown to be related to 
taking precautionary measures (Lavrakas et al., 1981)
Also, the presence of children may alter adults' 
perspectives on crime from individual fear to altruistic 
fear (e.g. fear for a spouse and for children) (Warr,
1992) . Although prior research has not addressed the 
relationship between life course stage and participation in 
crime-prevention organizations, the sociological literature 
has shown that life course constraints affect membership in 
various types of voluntary organizations. Obligations 
create incentives to join organizations, though time 
constraints may inhibit active membership when young 
children are in the home (Knoke and Thomson, 1977).
Further, families in the child-rearing stage of the life 
cycle are more likely to value enhanced police protection.
® Individual residents and neighborhoods with higher 
incomes make a relatively smaller sacrifice when they 
allocate funds for security measures (Knoke and Thomson, 
1977). Because there is very little variance in the 
neighborhood studied, I do not analyze income as a 
variable.
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However, they are also more likely to face constraints of 
having less free time and disposable income to contribute 
to joint goods.
Marxist scholars argue that residents who share a 
location depend on the same service provision, leading them 
to develop similar interests in the procurement of a 
service (Castells, 1977; 1983). Membership in specific 
socioeconomic groups suggests probable voting actions 
(Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1948). For example, 
"stakeholders" in the community are more likely to act in 
a pro-community manner, protecting themselves and their 
neighbors from the possibility of property devaluation 
(Logan and Molotch, 1987).
Lo (1990) has shown that homeowners form coalitions to 
keep property taxes low because they believe that they are 
paying a disproportionate share of tax revenue for the 
am.ount of goods and services they receive from the 
government. Policing is a good that is of common interest 
to all citizens and is shared by everyone, but the wealthy 
pay more for the service because they pay higher taxes.
The general public often views crime as a problem in "the 
other guy's neighborhood," with other areas getting worse 
while the respondent's own area is viewed as stable (DuBow 
et al., 1979) .
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Hga: Married householders will take more 
avoidance measures.
Hgb: Individuals who have children in the home 
will take more avoidance measures.
Hçg: Married householders will take more 
precautionary measures.
Hçb: Individuals who have children in the home 
will take more precautionary measures.
At the community level, research has shown that
homogeneous, middle-class areas are in a better position to
organize and provide social control than less affluent
areas (Skogan, 1990; Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Guest and
Oropesa, 1986; Oropesa, 1989; Crenson, 1983). Home
ownership increases one's stake in the community, which
encourages residents to improve the community and provide
social control (Crenson, 1983). Logan and Molotch (1987)
and Castells (1983) have discussed the role of community
organization development as a tool for the preservation of
homeowners' property values.
Residents may differ in their assessment of the
security deficit and they may also have different beliefs
about the efficacy of the system. Podolefsky and DuBow
(1981) studied differences between members and non-members
of neighborhood crime prevention groups. They found no
difference in perceptions of crime, neighborhood
conditions, or the efficacy of collective crime prevention
activities. Although family protection generates
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commitments, neighborhood association membership may be too
far removed from the same influences on protective measures
taken in and around the house.
Hioa: There will be no relationship between being 
married and neighborhood association membership.
There will be no relationship between having 
children in the home and neighborhood association 
membership.
There will be no relationship between 
educational attainment and neighborhood 
association membership.
Both the benefit and cost of policing are shared by 
all classes (though not equally), with several organized 
interests competing for public benefits (Castells, 1977, 
1983; Rich, 1982a, 1982b). Traditionally, membership in 
specific socioeconomic groups suggests probable voting 
actions (Lazarsfeld et al, 1948), but within a single 
homogeneous community income is not expected to be related 
to participation.
Tax liability will be explored for its influence on 
voting behavior. Hahn and Kamienecki (1987) argue that 
"while high status voters may be willing to utilize their 
resources to support local services in the communities in 
which they live, they apparently are not prepared to 
subsidize the disadvantaged" (p.124). Louisiana's 
homestead exemption law creates two groups of residents: 
those exempt from parish property taxes, and those that
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must pay parish property taxes. Surprisingly, research has 
shown that even though they pay more in taxes, the wealthy 
are often more supportive of tax increases than middle- 
income people. Wilson and Banfield (1964) explain this 
phenomenon as a function of diminishing marginal utility in 
which wealthier citizens make less of a sacrifice to pay 
additional taxes. However, Weaver and Parent (1994) show 
that this finding of wealthier citizens being more willing 
to support taxes holds only for developmental programs that 
improve the condition of the entire metropolitan area and 
not redistributive programs that provide more services for 
one section (most often less affluent) of the city.
Because crime is often viewed as a problem in "the other 
guy's neighborhood," I expect that a tax for enhanced 
criminal justice revenue will discourage some people from 
supporting the tax. Enhanced police protection may be 
viewed as developmental by some citizens and redistributive 
by others.
Hii: There will be no relationship between tax 
liability and electoral support for the tax 
referenda.
Because both electoral support and adoption of 
security measures by individual households are largely 
subject to individual decision-making processes, I argue
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that an effect similar to household adoption processes will 
occur.
H,_2: Married individuals and those who have 
children in the home will be more likely to vote 
for tax referenda which support supplemental 
policing measures.
Social Network Hypotheses
DeToqueville stated that civic associations are built 
through reciprocity among members (1956 {1835}).
Commitment to community varies, with homeowners and those 
with dense neighborhood relations being more willing to 
commit resources to the community. Length of residence and 
community attachment have been shown to be strongly related 
to residential stability and commitment to community 
organizations in previous studies- (Kasarda and Janowitz, 
1974) .
Toennies (1957) and Mirth (1938) are among theorists 
who have criticized the idea that communities offer 
solidarity and opportunities for social support in the 
modern age. Theories based on this tradition have been 
labeled "Community Lost" approaches (Wellman, 1979) . Both 
Wellman (1979) and Wellman and Wortley (1990) have refuted
Neighborhood interaction can be measured in terms of the 
frequency of informal interaction (Keller, 1968). Kasarda 
and Janowitz measured informal community participation 
through interaction with other residents and formal 
organization participation through a series of questions 
about participation in several different types of community 
organizations.
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the Community Lost approach by showing that many ties still 
exist among members of communities. The ties may be weak 
and single-stranded (offering minimal amounts of support 
and low levels of intimacy) but they do exist. Ties are no 
longer geographically bound. Podolefsky and DuBow (1981) 
found a significant difference between community 
organization participants and non-participants in that 
individuals who were more integrated into the community 
were more likely to participate.
Rich and Wandersman (1983) studied membership in urban 
neighborhood voluntary block associations. Demographic 
variables such as race, education, and occupation were not 
related to membership in these associations. Nor were 
psychological factors such as feelings of control over 
one's life, personal satisfaction, and political cynicism 
related to membership. Instead, variables reflecting 
"rootedness," such as length of residence and residential 
stability in the community (Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974; 
Hunter, 1975; Lewis and Salem, 1986; Sampson, 1988) and 
having a number of ties in the area (Guest and Oropesa,
1986; Crenson, 1983) are believed to influence involvement 
in the neighborhood.
Isolates have a greater fear of crime (Fischer, 1982) 
and are expected to take a greater number of measures to 
avoid being victimized. Because knowledge of neighbors
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decreases the number of "strangers" in the area (Hunter and 
Baumer, 1982), there is a greater freedom to interact 
around the neighborhood. Because residents more integrated 
in the community are expected to know more about the 
community, they are more able to differentiate "strangers" 
from neighbors and will take fewer avoidance measures.
: Those more integrated in the community will 
take fewer avoidance measures.
However, Skogan (1977) found that integration into the
community social network may lead to increased levels of
neighborhood gossip that can in turn, lead to more
knowledge of neighborhood crime and higher levels of fear.
Having knowledge of other burglary victims positively
affects the employment of protective measures against
burglary (Lavrakas et al., 1981). While knowledge of
neighbors may protect individuals from personal crime, this
knowledge offers little protection from property crime when
the resident is away from home. Because of this, I predict
no relationship between knowledge of neighbors and the
number of protective measures individuals take.
H,;.t,: There will be no relationship between 
integration in the community social network and 
the number of household protective measures 
taken.
Although people are more likely to join organizations 
of which their friends are members (Spaulding, 1966) , some 
research has questioned the rootedness explanation of
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community organization membership. In studying meso-level 
behaviors, both Hunter (19^5) and Guterbock (1980) found no 
relationship between local ties and membership in local 
organizations or political activity. *° As for macro-level 
behaviors, Laumann (1969, 1973) found that reciprocated 
friendship pairs neither matched nor described accurately 
their friends on political views, party registration, or 
ideation.
Political behavior is the product of the dialectic
between individuals and their surrounding culture (Hunter,
1975; Crenson, 1983) and those identifying with the
particular culture are more likely to take action.
Residents of a community may contribute to a community good
even if they do not value the good significantly more than
non-contributors do (Oskamp et al. 1991), or if there is
question about the patrolling providing security.
H-: Integration into the community will be 
associated with neighborhood association 
membership.
Network data will be used to examine the relationship 
between integration into the neighborhood and electoral 
behavior. Although Laumann (1969, 1973) found that 
reciprocated friendship pairs neither matched nor described 
friends' political views, party registration, or ideation.
■■ Both Hunter and Guterbock studied organizations which 
required both time commitments and monetary contributions
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Burstein (1976) found that friendship ties may be more
significant predictors than social and demographic
characteristics in predicting voting behavior. Other
factors which have been seen as significant, such as party
affiliation (Hahn and Kamieneki, 1987), ideology (Converse,
1964), gender of voter (Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld,
1980), and other sociodemographic factors (Campbell,
Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960) will be used as control
variables. Because tax referenda do not receive as much
publicity as candidate elections, there is considerably
less discussion and influence among peers about their
voting behavior. This should lead to less influence on
each other's voting decisions.
H:;: There will be no relationship between 
integration into the community social network and 
electoral support for tax referenda.
Rational Choice Hypotheses
Lavrakas et al. (1981) stated that "citizens become 
involved in anti-crime activities not because of personal 
assessment of being at risk or any past experiences with 
victimization, but rather as part of their participation 
with formal voluntary associations within the community 
(p.3)." The rational choice perspective takes individual 
interests as given and examines incentives and constraints 
for actors. It explores coercive abilities of others in
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the system and how others may influence actors' behaviors. 
Rational choice theory borrows from the psychological, 
stratification, and social network perspectives to develop 
an argument for support for security at the micro, meso, 
and macro levels. The psychological model contributes the 
value of the good to the equation. The stratification 
approach contributes the explanation that actors behave 
within the constraints of a system of like others and also 
form coalitions with that same group to procure public 
goods (Castells, 1977). The social network perspective 
views integration and rootedness as enhancing potential 
sanctioners' influence.
In the psychological model, fear is believed to be a 
salient variable predicting micro, meso, and macro security 
support. However, just as support for one kind of security 
is not necessarily related to support for another kind, the 
impact of fear on security practices is not constant at all 
levels. I expect fear to be a more salient predictor of 
action at the micro and macro levels, and a less salient 
predictor of support for security practices at the 
neighborhood organization (meso) l ev e l.W hil e  interests
Residents of neighborhoods with community crime watch 
programs who do not participate still have a lower risk of 
burglary than those in neighborhoods without similar 
programs (Lindsay and McGillis, 1986). By law, an officer 
on patrol cannot ignore specific homes, even if the officer 
is on private duty and the prospective victim does not
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are taken as a given, attitudinal development is considered 
to be a complex process combining status, networks, 
options, and constraints. Rational choice theory views 
attitudes as intervening variables.
From the stratification perspective, actors are 
influenced differently by their relationships for each type 
of security concern. The study of a single, homogeneous 
neighborhood does not allow for the analysis of some racial 
and socioeconomic effects on the various dimensions of 
security. Also, because this study focuses on the 
household as the unit of analysis, the relationship between 
sex and security-related behaviors is not analyzed.’-- At 
the micro level, the effect of status characteristics on 
the adoption of practices related to security will be 
explained by fear of crime. Status characteristics will 
only have an indirect effect through fear of crime. At the 
meso level, status characteristics should have no effect on 
neighborhood association membership because neighborhoods 
are relatively homogeneous entities (Massey and Denton,
1993; Fischer, 1982). At the macro level, wealthy people 
are more likely not to want to spend on redistributive
contribute dues.
-- I assume that a protective measure taken around the home 
benefits all members of the household, just as membership 
in the civic association covers households and not just 
individuals.
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referenda. Too, residents with little trust in the local
government are less likely to support tax increases for the
criminal justice system because they are less likely to
believe that government is capable or willing to address
their concerns.
Social network variables should affect individual
attitudes. However, I expect that there will be no effect
of integration in the community social network on household
security measures. Although balance theory (Heider, 1958;
Newcomb, 1961) would predict that associates are likely to
hold similar attitudes, Laumann (1973) showed that people
did not necessarily match their friends in private
decisions. Following Hechter (1987), visibility should be
a key variable in explaining network effects. Behaviors
must be visible in order to monitor the proscribed and
prescribed behaviors and some type of relationship must
exist for informal community sanctions to exist. Household
and civic level measures are private level behaviors.
Actions within the neighborhood are more visible and
subject to monitoring.
H^ g^: Household avoidance security measures will 
be explained almost entirely by fear of crime.
Higb- Household preventive security measures will 
be explained almost entirely by fear of crime.
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Hi:: Neighborhood association membership will be 
explained by fear to a lesser extent than at 
micro and macro levels and integration in the 
neighborhood.
Hia: Security-related voting behavior will be 
explained by fear of crime and trust in the local 
government.
Data and Variable Description
Data
Data were collected, in face-to-face interviews, with 
137 residents of a single neighborhood in Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana (see Appendix A). That neighborhood is referred 
to here by the pseudonym "Midtown." Because neighborhood 
of residence is a key variable affecting attitudes and 
actions related to community life (Crenson, 1983), the 
investigation of one homogeneous neighborhood in detail 
provides an appropriate context in which to test my 
hypotheses. Several important factors can be held constant 
including neighborhood history, cultural influences, race, 
education, and income. I use the Midtown neighborhood as a 
case study in order to test a stable, relatively 
homogeneous system of actors. A variety of methods are 
employed to illustrate the social context of neighborhood 
life.
^^ This neighborhood is an older, established geographic 
area located within a homogeneous U.S. Census classified 
block group. It is composed of parts of two census tracts 
(see Appendix A). Residents of this area are part of a
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The Midtown area is worthy of study because:
a) It is a stable community that offers the opportunity for 
meeting and interacting with others.
b) Residents of the area represent an important segment of 
the electorate with high voting participation in all types 
of elections.
c) House values are mixed, resulting in variability in 
property tax liability among the area's residents.
d) Residents of this area can afford to pay for private 
duty patrolling in their neighborhood.
The survey instrument included several questions 
about the respondents' household structure, and 
socioeconomic status, as well as sentiments about their 
neighborhood, social networks, personal and neighborhood 
security, public affairs, crime, and racial issues. 
Questions measuring fear of crime, social status, and 
social networks are key independent variables in the 
hypotheses.
The Midtown area is homogeneous with respect to race, 
income, and education (see Appendix A, Table A-3). The 
area is located in a census block group that is 99% non- 
Hispanic white, 0% black. Median income is well above that
homogeneous voting precinct. I have chosen this area to 
study because it is recognized as a neighborhood by most of 
its residents though the study area does not exist within a 
governmentally classified geographic region.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
57
of city as a whole. Fewer than 1% of the residents are 
recorded as living below the poverty line, and no one in 
this block group is on public assistance (1990 U.S.
Census). The median year in which the housing structure 
was built was 1953. In short, this area is an older, 
established neighborhood whose residents are white and 
middle class. However, due to its location near the city 
center, it is surrounded by less affluent minority 
neighborhoods with higher crime rates. In chapter three, I 
will give a detailed account of community characteristics 
based on survey responses.
Among collective crime-prevention programs, 
"neighborhood watch" programs are among the most common and 
most studied. The primary purpose of neighborhood watch is 
to promote surveillance of the neighborhood by residents, 
but effectiveness of this program is questionable.
(Garofalo and McLeod, 1989). Also, because most 
neighborhood watch programs have no fees, dues, or time 
commitments, it is often difficult to study participation 
and commitment to the program (Garofalo and McLeod, 1989; 
Lewis et al, 1988). For this reason it is preferable to 
study residents' participation at the neighborhood level 
where there exist recorded contributions to the local civic 
association.
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I conducted several interviews with founders and 
current leaders of this group. Ms. Jones, the leader of 
the group, was born and raised in the neighborhood and 
purchased her house in 1979. Along with a few friends and 
family members residing in the area, she decided to start 
an independent neighborhood security organization. Dues 
were established at $30.00 a month for area schools and the 
synagogue and $10.00 for the area's residents. The group 
began hiring off-duty patrols for two to four hours per day 
at a rate of $10.00 per hour. In 1995, they paid $12.00 an 
hour for four to six hours per day patrolling. This 
provision of security the only activity of the group. The 
police patrol the neighborhood in a marked car, stopping 
and questioning people they believe are not area 
residents.-’ According to Ms. Jones, an officer once told 
her "we don't 'have a lot to do" and she replied "that's our 
goal." All of the civic association's budget goes toward 
police patrolling and as a group, they have no political 
opinions or goals. They have no regular meetings because 
attempts have produced very low turnout.
In addition to this neighborhood level program, I have 
chosen to analyze three recent tax referenda that targeted 
the municipal criminal justice system as the beneficiary of
During the interviewing process, I was stopped and 
questioned by the police at three different times.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
5 9
the revenue. The first occurred in January, 1992, a 
sheriff's tax referendum that failed by a 3-to-l margin.
The East Baton Rouge law enforcement district tax was the 
only issue on the ballot that day. The tax proposed to 
supply $7.4 million per year for 10 years, to pay for 
employee raises, pay off the office's deficit, allow for 
hiring new employees, and create an emergency surplus fund. 
Because the tax lacked specifics, groups across the 
political spectrum opposed this tax.
In July of 1992, the city of Baton Rouge proposed a 
property tax for the police and fire departments. The 
distribution of the tax was clearly outlined and 
publicized. Salaries would be raised and outdated 
equipment would be replaced. This tax was supported by the 
mayor, 11 of the 12 metropolitan council members, the AFL- 
CIO, major media outlets, and many other groups. The tax 
was opposed by a marriage of convenience consisting of the 
NAACP, Nation of Islam, and East Baton Rouge Parish 
Republican executive committee. Republicans fought the 
idea of the tax and the black community was angered over 
two recent police shooting deaths of an unarmed black youth 
and a retarded black man with a toy gun.
In October 1993, a third tax proposal was placed on 
the ballot. Sheriff Elmer Litchfield campaigned heavily 
for the tax and promised to open his budget to the public.
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Litchfield promised to hire 65 new deputies, to reopen the 
444-bed wing of the parish prison closed in 1992, hire 
another 19 officers for other areas of the department, and 
give the deputies a $2Q0-a-month raise and clerical workers 
$100 more per month. If the tax referendum failed, $1.6 
million would be cut, forcing closure of 40 - 116 more 
prison beds. This referendum passed.
Dependent Variables
Household security measures are analyzed individually 
as dependent variables and are grouped into indices. One 
index consists of avoidance behaviors and another of 
protective measures. Neighborhood participation is 
measured both by self-report and presence on a list of 
current dues-paying members of the Midtown Neighborhood 
Association (MNA). Support for civic-level security 
improvement is measured by the respondents' reported voting 
history on three tax referenda elections held in 1992 and
At the time of this referendum. Republican incumbent 
Elmer Litchfield appeared to be entrenched in his position 
as he sought a third term as East Baton Rouge Parish 
Sheriff, facing Democrat Loyd Ingle as token opposition. 
With a few minor referenda on the ballot, this was the most 
publicized contest of a relatively unpublicized election 
day. Before becoming sheriff, Litchfield was a retired FBI 
agent. Ingle's only experience with the law seemed to be 
that he was booked three times (twice for suspicion of DUl, 
once for a fight in a bar). Ingle also received negative 
press earlier in the year when he was shot four times by 
his wife during an argument. 1 expected that only the most 
loyal Democrat would vote for him as sheriff.
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1993. The index of avoidance measures*” consists of the 
responses to three survey questions with a yes or no 
response :
Do you ever avoid going out
alone?
Do you ever avoid going out at
night?
Do you ever avoid going some places
in the city?
Responses to eight survey questions dealing with 
protective measures are used to construct a protective 
measure index.*'
Cronbach's alpha for this three item scale is .617. A 
principal component analysis of 11 micro-level security 
measures creates this three term factor (eigenvalue =
1.64) .
Cronbach's alpha for this scale is .517. It could be 
argued that this score is not very high. However, the 
nature of protective security measures vary. Further 
research should examine dimensions and determinants of 
avoidance and protective measures. Of significant factors 
created other than the three variable index of avoidance 
measures, I saw no "simple structure" (Hatcher and 
Stepanski, 1994) which these variables are related to the 
exclusion of others (such as the factor combination of 
leaving the television, radio, or lights on when out and 
purchasing a weapon for protection). Therefore, I have 
chosen to add the remaining household security variables as 
protective.
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Since you have moved into your home, have 
you:
installed an alarm system?
installed dead bolts?
purchased a dog for protection?
installed a security fence?
left the tv, radio, or lights on when
out?
purchased weapons for protection? 
installed window locks or grates?
At the meso level, I will measure participation in 
community security by the record of dues collection kept by 
the treasurer of the Midtown Neighborhood Association. If 
a person had paid dues for at least six months out of the 
previous year, they were counted as a member.
At the macro level, I will analyze three separate 
responses to dichotomous questions that were asked on the 
survey. Turnout and voting choice are two distinct 
phenomena. For each of the three elections, I will measure 
support/opposition to the tax, with analysis focusing on 
the electoral decision.-'
The questions were worded as follows:
The dimensions studied here were not significant 
predictors of electoral turnout. I have chosen not to 
interpret the absence of this effect.
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Did you vote in the tax election for the 
sheriffs department this past October 
loth?
If yes:
How did you vote?
If you remember, last year both the 
sheriff's department (January, 1992) and 
the city police department (July, 1992) 
had elections that would have raised 
property taxes in order to provide more 
funding.
Did you vote in the sheriff's tax 
election in January of 1992?
If yes:
How did you vote?
Did you vote in the police department's 
tax election in July, 1992?
If yes:
How did you vote?
Independent Variables
In addressing the psychological argument, one must 
acknowledge that measuring fear of crime is not simple. 
Ferraro and Lagrange (1987) reviewed the fear of crime 
literature and argued that different questions yield 
different results. Their work supported the validity of a 
question that is often included in the NORC General Social 
Survey:
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Is there any area right around here —  that is, 
within a mile —  where you would be afraid to 
walk alone at night?
This question addresses fear within a boundary close to the 
individual's home.
Racial sentiment was recorded by the respondent's 
answer on a four-point scale of agree strongly, agree 
somewhat, disagree somewhat, and disagree strongly to the 
statement, "Blacks have too little influence in the life 
and politics of Baton Rouge.
Race, like security, is not a simple issue which can be 
measured perfectly by one variable (Black and Black, 1989). 
Responses to eight racial attitude variables were subjected 
to a principal component analysis using the value of 1.0 as 
prior communality estimates. The principal axis method was 
used to extract the components, followed by a varimax 
(orthogonal) rotation (Hatcher and Stepanski, 1994) .
Though the first three components displayed eigenvalues 
greater than 1 and scree tests suggested that the first 
three factors were meaningful, two of the factors failed to 
meet Hatcher and Stepanski's criteria of having at least 
three variables with significant loadings on the retained 
components. The remaining factor accounts for only thirty- 
three percent of the total variance.
Findings suggest that "racial attitudes" are not 
captured by a single variable or factor, but are products 
of a multi-level belief system. Blumer (1955) suggested 
three color lines:
a) The outer color line supports basic human 
rights of public facility access and voting 
rights for people regardless of race.
b) The intermediate color line measures the 
rights of individuals to reside in communities of 
their choice, equal employment opportunity, and 
fair access to schools.
c) The inner color line measures access to 
friendship among races.
Numerous combinations of the variables that measure
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My measures of status characteristics are limited.
Due to the lack of variance in the community on several 
socioeconomic status variables, it is not possible to 
analyze income and race effects.^ The analysis is 
therefore limited to assessing the effects of family living 
arrangements and education. The survey asks the number of 
children under age twelve living in the home. Education is 
measured as the number of years of schooling completed.
Tax liability was recorded from the East Baton Rouge 
property tax assessment roles. Midtown residents listed as 
having some property tax liability were recorded as liable, 
while those with a homestead exemption on record for all of 
their property were recorded as exempt.
racial attitudes provided scales with little internal 
consistency (alphas ranging between .29 and .41). Zero- 
order correlations show that the statement measuring black 
influence in the life and politics of Baton Rouge is 
significantly related to other measures representing the 
outer color line ("The police are too hard on blacks,"
"The courts are too hard on blacks") and the intermediate 
color line ("People have the right to refuse to sell their 
property to anyone they choose, black or white," "Most 
people would prefer to live in neighborhoods with people of 
their same race," "Would you personally prefer to live in a 
neighborhood that is 1) all white 2) mostly white 3) 
about half black and half white (and no respondent selected 
4) mostly black 5) all black)."
Four out of five residents reported more than $ 30,000 a 
year and more than half earn more than $ 45,000 a year. 
Because the highest income category reported was $ 65,000 
or above, there was little variance in the Midtown sample. 
There are no black residents in the area.
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To measure social networks, I used a name generator - 
name interpreter sequence. Name generators set the 
boundary that is examined in a survey for the respondents' 
social networks (Marsden, 1987). Name interpreters elicit 
the characteristics of network members. I used the name 
interpreter that was used in the 1985 General Social 
Survey: "From time to time, people discuss important 
matters with other people. Looking back over the last six 
months - who are the people with whom you discussed matters 
important to you?" Both first and last names were 
elicited. Four other name generators were also used: "Just 
counting the adults, who are the people that normally live 
in this household? Not including the people who live here, 
what adult relatives do you or your husband/wife have in 
the Midtown area? Are there any people in the Midtown area 
that you would consider friends or close personal 
acquaintances? How about in the Baton Rouge area. Are 
there any you would consider friends or close personal 
acquaintances?"
Full names were given by 93 of the 137 respondents 
(sixty-eight percent). First names only or descriptions of 
associates (my sister, my friend, my neighbor) were given 
in 27 of the 137 cases (twenty percent). Twelve percent 
refused to complete this section or gave very sketchy 
information such as "mostly family" or "my friends."
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The name interpreters asked respondents how long they 
have known each alter; whether each associate was a 
relative, whether each person lived in the household; the 
neighborhood, and the city. Next they were asked each 
associate's sex and race; their degree of "closeness;" 
whether they have visited the associate in the past six 
months; and whether they care for each other's homes when 
they are away (Fischer, 1982).
Integration into the community social network is 
measured by the number of associates listed that were 
recorded as living in the neighborhood. Because both first 
and last names are not needed for this measure, 120 
(eighty-eight percent) of the respondents' questionnaires 
are usable for measurement of this dimension.
Trust in local government was measured on a three- 
point scale. Respondents were asked "How much of the time 
would you say you trust the local government? - most of the 
time, some of the time, almost never."
This chapter has outlined hypotheses on the 
determinants of various dimensions of security and proposed 
tests of the psychological, stratification, social network, 
and rational choice perspectives. In chapter three, I show 
that no single variable or perspective can completely 
explain household, community, and public provision of the 
good of security.
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CHAPTER 3. ANALYSIS
Introduction
In this chapter, I begin by presenting descriptive 
statistics for the sample. Next I examine the 
relationships among the levels of security that are used as 
my three primary dependent dimensions. I then present 
descriptive statistics for the independent variables. 
Finally, hypotheses that derived from the psychological, 
stratification, social network, and rational choice 
perspectives are tested.
Sample Characteristics
This section describes the Midtown area as, a 
relatively homogeneous, older, stable, white, middle class 
neighborhood. I discuss social composition, commitment to 
the community trust, and political views before turning to 
attitudes on fear and violence. For purposes of comparing 
the Midtown survey sample with the city as a whole, I use a 
similar survey conducted by the Louisiana State University 
Center For Life Course and Population Studies. This survey 
was administered to a random sample of East Baton Rouge 
Parish residents (n=139) in October, 1994. That survey 
contained questions that parallel those used in the Midtown 
survey. In what follows, any reference to opinions or
68
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characteristics of Baton Rouge as a whole should be 
construed as referring to this study unless noted.
The Midtown data come from a face-to-face survey 
conducted within each household during daylight hours. 
Respondents were selected by asking for "the person who 
spends the most time around the house." Women were 
therefore overrepresented in this sample, comprising sixty- 
four percent of the respondents as compared to the Baton 
Rouge telephone poll which was forty-nine percent female. 
Ninety-seven percent of the Midtown sample was non-Hispanic 
white while the Baton Rouge sample was seventy-three 
percent white. The average age was fifty-three, (ranging 
from twenty-six to one hundred), while the average 
respondent in the Baton Rouge poll was forty.-* The median 
household annual income range reported was between $45,000 
and $60,000, well above the East Baton Rouge parish median 
income of $27,224 (1990 U.S. Census) and the median income 
range of $25,000 to $35,000 for the Baton Rouge poll.^ 
Forty-five percent of the Midtown sample owns real estate
-- Median ages were thirty-seven years for Baton Rouge and 
forty-four for the Midtown area.
-- According to 1990 U.S. Census, this neighborhood lies 
within in a block group with a 1989 median household income 
of $36,544. Less than one percent of the individuals in 
the Midtown sample live with incomes under the poverty line 
in contrast to the nine percent of East Baton Rouge Parish 
whites.
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valued in excess of $75,000 and are liable for parish 
property taxes. The median duration of neighborhood 
residence is fifteen years for Midtown residents as 
compared to five years for East Baton Rouge Parish as a 
whole.
Midtown residents are highly educated. Only two 
percent of the sample reported fewer than twelve years of 
formal education, while fifty-five percent report having 16 
or more years of education (college and post-graduate 
degrees) Only sixty percent of the respondents were 
married. The rest were single, divorced, or widowed.
Thirty percent of the households contain children.
Residents reported a high degree of commitment to the 
Midtown neighborhood. Seventy-five percent said they would 
be very sorry to leave if for some reason they had to move 
away (ninety-eight percent said they would be either very 
or somewhat sorry to leave). In response to the question 
of whether Midtown residents considered their neighborhood 
to be "a real home" or "just a place where they happen to 
be living," ninety-six percent responded that they consider 
this neighborhood to be a "real home." This is
All respondents in the Midtown survey lived in single 
family homes.
Median education completed was fourteen years for Baton 
Rouge as a whole and sixteen years for the Midtown sample.
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considerably higher from the sixty percent of East Baton 
Rouge Parish residents who considered their own 
neighborhood a "real home." Midtown residents are also 
optimistic about the community. When asked if they 
believed their neighborhood had "become a better place to 
live, stayed the same, or gotten worse in the past two 
years," twenty-five percent reported that the neighborhood 
has become a better place to live, while only five percent 
reported that the neighborhood had gotten w o r s e . T e n  
percent believe the neighborhood will be a better place to 
live two years from now, while only three percent believe 
that it will have gotten worse.
In response to a question on how many people in their 
neighborhood can be trusted, seventy-five percent stated 
that almost all residents can be trusted and twenty-five 
percent claimed that most residents can be trusted. Less 
than one percent of the sample reported that people from 
the neighborhood were responsible for most of the crime 
occurring in the Midtown neighborhood. Nearly ninety-eight 
percent of the Midtown residents surveyed stated that they 
believed that most crimes in the neighborhood are 
perpetrated by Baton Rouge residents from other
Of the Baton Rouge sample, fourteen percent claimed that 
their neighborhood was a better place to live, sixty-seven 
percent said it was the same, and nineteen percent report 
that the neighborhood had gotten worse.
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neighborhoods and almost two percent reported that most 
crimes in Midtown are committed by residents outside of 
Baton Rouge.
Seventy-four percent of Midtown residents claimed to 
know at least most of their neighbors by sight and sixty- 
three percent claimed to know at least most of their 
neighbors by name. While these items offer some indication 
of a potential sense of community, residents do not report 
high levels of intimate interaction. When asked how often 
they get together with neighbors for picnics or parties, 
only two percent said often and twenty-four percent said 
sometimes. A full seventy-four percent rarely or never 
socialize with their neighbors.
Residents of Midtown claim to be concerned with 
political issues.-® Ninety-two percent are registered to 
vote and the precinct in which the Midtown neighborhood is
Although most residents claim to be concerned with 
political issues, the Midtown Neighborhood Association is 
only involved with the provision of supplemental police 
patrolling. They take no official stand on any other 
issue. The work of Lavrakas et al. (1981) and Podolefsky 
and DuBow (1981) deals with crime prevention efforts within 
community organizations. The organization I studied does 
not exist for any reason other than crime prevention. 
Podolefsky and DuBow, Lavrakas et al., and the Reactions to 
Crime Project advocate the idea that most citizens 
participate in neighborhood based anti-crime programs as 
one aspect of their participation within the community and 
not because of fear of crime.
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located consistently shows higher than average turnout.-' 
Fewer than nine percent of the respondents claim to follow 
local government "only now and then" or "hardly at all." 
Half of the Midtown residents surveyed have written or 
spoken to their metropolitan council representatives or 
local leaders. As far as trust in the local government, 
twenty-five percent reported trusting the local government 
"most of the time," fifty-six percent "some of the time," 
and nineteen percent "almost never" trust the local 
government.-® East Baton Rouge Parish as a whole appears 
to be slightly less trusting, with only fifteen percent 
trusting the local government "most of the time," forty- 
eight percent "some of the time," and thirty-seven percent 
"almost never."
Voters in this area may not be categorized as 
consistently supporting or opposing all tax millages for 
law enforcement. While seventy-two percent voted in favor 
of the 1993 measure that passed, fewer than half supported 
the 1992 measures that failed.
Turnout for the precinct that contains the Midtown 
neighborhood is twice the city average in some elections.
-® Trust may be a relative concept. Several respondents 
asked whether the local government excluded the state 
legislature and Governor. After the interviewer responded 
that this question was only about the city-parish 
government, most respondents indicated some level of trust.
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While the Midtown area has many characteristics of a 
"conservative" neighborhood, political views are 
represented across the spectrum. The mean respondent score 
is 4.6 on a seven-point scale on which 1 represents 
extremely liberal and 7 represents extremely conservative. 
This score does not differ significantly from the score of 
4.4 for Baton Rouge as a whole.
Attitudes on Fear and Violence
In the past two years, only two (1.5 percent) Midtown 
residents had been victimized by violent crime but nearly 
twenty percent have had some type of crime committed 
against their property. An additional ten percent claimed 
that others residing in their home had been victimized in 
the past two years. More than forty-four percent know 
others who have been victimized.
Table 3.1
Crime Victimization
Has been a victim of violent
crime in the past two years 1.5%
Has been a victim of property
crime in the past two years 19.7%
Has been a victim of other crime
in the past two years 10.2%
Knows neighbors that were 44.2%
victimized by crime
Respondents were then asked their general opinions 
concerning the safety of Baton Rouge. Eighty-three percent
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of the sample agreed strongly or somewhat with the 
statement, "Crime is the most important issue facing us 
right now" (fifty percent agreed strongly; Table 3.2). 
However, fear of crime and perceptions of safety are not 
easily measured. Table 3.3 describes responses to several 
dimensions of fear. No respondent described the city of 
Baton Rouge as "very safe" and only one-third of the sample 
described the city as "fairly safe." In contrast, nearly 
ninety-six percent described the Midtown neighborhood as 
either "very" or "fairly safe," while eighty-eight percent 
of Baton Rouge as a whole described their neighborhood 
similarly. Just over ninety-six percent of Midtown 
residents (ninety-one percent of Baton Rouge) reported 
their home to be "very" or "fairly safe," while no Midtown 
residents (and only 4.3% of Baton Rouge residents) 
described their home as "not safe at all." Ninety-one 
percent believed themselves to be "very" or "fairly safe." 
Only twenty-eight percent stated that they ever worry about 
the safety of young children (under 12) playing outside 
around here (Table 3.4).--
Some of the respondents replying in the affirmative 
stated that they were primarily concerned about the safety 
of children playing in the street being hit by cars.
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Crime is the Most 
Important Issue
50.0% 32.8% 14.8% 2.3%
Table 3.3" 









Baton Rouge Safety 0.0% 34.8% 60.7% 4.4%
Neighborhood
Safety
25.2% 70.4% 3.7% 0.7%
Home Safety 35.0% 61.3% 3.6% 0.0%




Worry about safety of
children playing in area 28.0 72.0
Afraid to walk alone in
area at night 84.7 15.3
In sum, respondents feel they reside in a safe 
neighborhood in a dangerous city. Though the neighborhood 
is reported to be safe, most respondents believe that areas 
surrounding their neighborhood may be dangerous. Eighty- 
five percent of Midtown residents interviewed responded
Among the 187 places in the United States with 
populations above 100,000, Baton Rouge was ranked the 8th 
most dangerous city in America, in terms of violent crime 
rates (Updegrave, 1994).
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affirmatively to the questions: "Is there any area right 
around here— that is, within a mile— where you would be 
afraid to walk alone at night?" in contrast to fifty-two 
percent of the East Baton Rouge Parish sample.
Table 3.5 lists affirmative responses to avoidance 
measures. Thirty-nine percent reported going out alone, 
nearly forty-three percent avoided going out at night, and 
eighty-eight percent avoided certain places in the city.^
Table 3.5
Avoidance Measures 
Avoid going out alone 38.8%
Avoid going out at night 42.5%
Avoid going certain places in the city 88.0%
Table 3.6 shows protective measures taken since moving 
into their home. Precautionary measures already on the 
home before they moved in were not included. Twenty-nine 
percent installed an alarm system, sixty-nine percent 
installed deadbolt locks on their doors, and twenty-one
This disparity in the samples may be at least partially 
explained by the overrepresentation of elderly and female 
respondents in the Midtown survey. However, it may be more 
likely that the difference in fear of surrounding areas 
comes from the location of the Midtown neighborhood near 
poor (and high crime) neighborhoods in the central city.
The Baton Rouge survey asked a question "Thinking about 
the neighborhoods in Baton Rouge, are there any you go out 
of your way to avoid driving through?" Sixty-four percent 
responded "yes."
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percent purchased a dog for protection. Most residents 
(seventy-one percent) installed outside lighting and 
fifteen percent installed a security fence. Four out of 
five respondents reported leaving a television, radio, or 
lights on when they go out. One out of six purchased a 
weapon for protection.^ Thirty-six percent installed 
locks on their windows.
Table 3.6
Protective measures 
Purchased an alarm system 29.2
Installed deadbolt locks 68.7
Has dog for protection 21.2
Installed outside lighting 70.5
Installed security fence 14.5
Leave TV, radio, or lights on when out 79.5
Purchased weapon for protection 16.2
Installed locks on windows 35.9
Owning a dog for protection is a matter of definition. 
Some owners of small dogs claimed that the dogs aided in 
security, while other owners claimed that their dogs 
offered no security.
Forty-one percent of Midtown residents reported owning a 
gun of some type. Thirty-nine percent of these gun owners 
reported that the gun was primarily for protection and 
thirty-one percent said that the gun was for both hunting 
and protection. While forty-nine percent of Baton Rouge as 
a whole reported gun ownership, only thirty-one percent of 
the gun owners claimed that the gun was primarily for 
protection and thirty percent for both hunting and 
protection. Though Midtown residents are slightly less 
likely to own a gun, they are more likely to own the gun 
for protection.
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Turning to community-level security. Midtown 
Neighborhood Association records show that dues payment 
participation has fluctuated from fifty to eighty percent 
since the inception of the organization. In January of 
1994, about seventy percent of households in the Midtown 
area paid dues while seventy-six percent of those surveyed 
had paid dues.^
Macro-level security actions are indicated by voting 
behavior. Overall, this neighborhood is more supportive of 
the city's law enforcement agencies than the rest of the 
parish (city police and parish sheriff's office; Table 
3.7). Only six percent of the Midtown residents disagreed 
somewhat and no one strongly disagreed with the statement, 
"the police and deputies generally do a good job in Baton 
Rouge," while nineteen percent of those sampled in the East 
Baton Rouge Parish survey disagreed somewhat or strongly. 
Only two percent of the Midtown residents disagreed 
strongly or somewhat with the statement that "the police 
and deputies generally do a good job in this neighborhood," 
while seventeen percent disagreed somewhat or strongly in 
the parish. Eighty-seven percent support (strongly or 
somewhat) increased revenue for local law enforcement
Respondents were not significantly more likely to be MNA 
members than non-respondents (chi-square = 3.43, not 
significant at .05 level).
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
8 0
agencies. Eighty percent agreed strongly or somewhat that 
"more money needs to be spent on law enforcement in order 
to reduce the incidence of crime." Not only do residents 
of this neighborhood support the local law enforcement 
agencies, but they also show great support for the concept 
of the "neighborhood beat cop." Over two-thirds strongly 
agreed with the statement "it would be better if the same 
police officers patrolled this neighborhood all the time 
and the people knew who they were" (a total of ninety-three
percent agreed strongly or somewhat to this statement).
When asked who is responsible for the crimes committed 
in the Midtown neighborhood, only 0.8 percent responded 
that it is residents in the neighborhood while over 99 
percent reported that people from outside the neighborhood 
commit the crimes.
Racial attitudes are often difficult to measure. We 
inquired about opinions on several race-related issues. In
opinions on racial fear, sixty-one percent of the
respondents agreed strongly or somewhat with the statement 
that "most whites fear blacks," while only thirty-one 
percent agreed strongly or somewhat with the statement that
The Midtown sample is similar to the city as a whole. 
Sixty-three percent agreed strongly and eighty-four agreed 
either strongly or somewhat having the same police 
patrolling their home neighborhood.




Police do a good 
job in Baton 
Rouge
Police do a good 
job in this 
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More money should 
be spent on law 
enforcement
Better if the 
same police 
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area all the time






Do police pay more, less, 
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police in this 
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"most blacks fear whites." Only thirty-three percent 
agreed with the statement that the government should not 
make any special effort to help minorities.
In political issues related to both race and crime, 
twenty-seven percent agreed that "the police are too hard




Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
Most whites fear 14.8 45.1 31.3 7.8
blacks
Most blacks fear 2.4 29.0 42.7 25.8
whites
Govt, should not 8.6 24.2 45.3 21.9
make special 
efforts to help 
minorities
Police are too 3.3 24.0 32.2 40.5
hard on blacks
Courts are harder 6.8 25.4 33.1 34.7
on blacks than
whites
Blacks have too 11.7 16.7 37.5 34.4
little influence 
in Baton Rouge
People can refuse 46.6 29.6 11.5 12.2
to sell home to 
anyone they 
choose
on blacks" and thirty-two percent agreed with the statement 
that "the courts in this area are harder on blacks than 
they are on whites." Seventy-two percent of the 
respondents disagreed with the statement "blacks have too 
little influence in the life and politics of Baton Rouge." 
In a question dealing with property rights, 7 6 percent 
agreed with the statement that "people have the right to
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refuse to sell their property to anyone they choose, black 
or white . "
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.9 presents simple descriptive statistics for 
the dependent variables in the analysis. Residents average 
1.7 of the three avoidance measures, 3.3 of the nine 
protective measures, and 5 of the 12 total household 
measures that could be taken (see Appendix A). At the 
neighborhood level, 75.6 percent of the eligible residents 
of the community paid membership dues for the civic 
association in January, 1994.-- Though the first two tax 
referenda failed, fifty-eight percent of the respondents 
reported voting in favor of the first sheriff's tax 
referendum and fifty-five percent of the sample reported 
voting for the second (July, 1992). In contrast, eighty 
percent of the sample voted in favor of the sheriff's tax 
referendum (October, 1993), which passed by a two-to-one 
margin. In all three elections. Midtown's electoral 
support for the taxes exceeded the citywide outcome by 
about twenty percent. This discovery supports
Some respondents disagreeing with this statement claimed 
that they disagreed with this statement only because there 
is a law forbidding this practice.
I use the month of January, 1994, to indicate 
association membership because it is the midpoint of data 
collection.
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Table 3.9
Simple Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables 
(n=137i
Mean std
No. of avoidance measures 1.7 1.04
No. of protective measures 3.3 1.64
No. of household measures 5.0 2.11
Percentages
Paid neighborhood assn. dues 7 5.6%
Voted for the January 1992 58.0%
sheriff's tax
Voted for the July 1992 55.1%
police tax
Voted for the October 1993 80.0%
sheriff's tax
Wilson and Banfield's (1964) claim that more affluent areas 
are actually more likely than most other areas to support 
increased municipal taxes. Midtown residents were about 
twice as likely as residents of other areas to participate 
in these moderately low turnout elections.
Table 3.10 presents descriptive statistics for the 
independent variables to be used in testing the hypotheses. 
Though the neighborhood is more affluent than the city and 
parish averages, fifty-five percent are exempt from paying 
any parish property tax.
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Table 3.10




Exempt from Parish Property taxes 55.3%
Non-Demographic Percentage
Afraid to Walk Alone in Area 84.7%
Non-Demographic Means
Number of Associates Living in 2.40 2.27
Neighborhood
Black Influence Score 2.95 .99
(l=too little, 4=too much)
Political ideology score 4.57 1.53
(l=very liberal, 7=very conservative)
Trust in local government 1.95 .56
(l=most of the time, 3=almost never)
An average of only 2.7 associates listed were 
residents of the Midtown neighborhood.^- This does not 
mean that residents are isolates locked inside their homes, 
but that needs of daily living are often fulfilled outside 
of the neighborhood (Wellman, 1979; Wellman and Wortley, 
1990). The average respondent disagreed somewhat with the 
statement that "blacks have too little influence in the 
life and politics of Baton Rouge."
Marsden (1987) reports that the 1985 General Social 
Survey mean and mode are three associates listed by the 
respondent. The names generated by this study are focused 
more on those residing within the boundary of the Midtown 
neighborhood.




The first issue to be addressed is the question of 
whether various levels of security measures are 
substitutional or complementary. Does taking security 
precautions at one level reduce or increase the likelihood 
of support for security measures at other levels? An 
argument can be made that one type of security lessens the 
need for other types of security. This substitutional 
argument claims that participating in one level of security 
actually eliminates the necessity of participating in 
another level of security. A substitutional argument would 
lead to the expectation of negative relationships between 
micro, meso, and macro security measures. Alternatively, 
the complementary argument claims that some people value 
security more highly than others and, hence, the adoption 
of one type of security should be positively related to 
support for another type of security. If micro, meso, and 
macro security measures are all positively related, then 
these relationships support the complementary argument.
Correlations between indicators do not offer clear and 
consistent support for either argument. Contrary to the 
predicted direction of hypothesis #1 but supporting the 
substitutional argument, those residents taking more
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security measures in and around their home are 
significantly less likely to support the tax referenda. 
However, residents taking a larger number of security 
measures are more likely to pay dues to the neighborhood 
association. There appears to be no significant 
relationship between membership in the neighborhood 
organization and support for the tax referenda.
Thus, there is partial support for the complementary 
argument. The data show a significant positive 
relationship between the number of individual/household 
security measures taken and paying Midtown Neighborhood 
association dues (r = .245, p = .039). This finding 
supports the complementary argument that dues paying is 
either complementary at all levels or dues paying is an 
individual level decision just as other 
individual/household measures.
Neither the complementary nor the substitutional 
argument presents a simple explanation of observed 
relationships between security practices. Nor does either 
provide a solution applicable to all combinations of 
levels. Micro and meso levels of security appear to be 
complementary, while together these are substitutional with 
respect to macro-level security.
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Table 3.11 presents the zero-order correlation 
coefficients for variables used in suggesting a reversal of 
direction for the hypothesis stating that residents taking 
more security measures in and around their home will be 
more likely to support the tax referenda. Data from the 
first two elections show a strong negative relationship 
between the number of household security precautions and 
support for the tax referendum, while the third election 
(October, 1993) shows no significant relationship. The 
October 1993 election differs from the other two elections 
in that the city-parish government and the sheriff's office 
presented a well-organized public relations and advertising 
campaign that was absent in the previous two elections.
The value of public relations and advertising is difficult 
to measure and will not be explored in this dissertation. 
Instead, I interpret this negative relationship in two out 
of the three elections as support for a substitutional 
account of the relationship between micro and macro 
security provision.
Voting participation was not significant in any of the 
three elections.
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Table 3.11
Correlation Table of Household Security Measures and Tax
Jan. '92 Vote 
July '92 Vote
















Tables 3.12a, 3.12b, and 3.12c show that the 
association between paying MNA dues and support for each of 
the tax referenda is not significantly different from
Table 3.12a
MNA dues payment status bv Vote in January, 1992 tax 
referendum
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Table 3.12b




Vote in July 
1992 Police Tax 
Election





































chance. Neither substitutional nor complementary 
explanations for security are supported by this finding.
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Though paying neighborhood association dues and voting in 
municipal policing tax referenda are individual decisions, 
they represent contributions to collective goods that 
cannot be explained simply by placing a value on the good 
of security. Later in this chapter, I will explore other 
factors that may influence security provision at meso and 
macro levels.
Figure 1 illustrates observed relationships between 
security practices, showing that no simple conclusion can 
be made about relationships among all types of security 
measures. Residents taking more individual/household 
security measures are more likely to contribute to 
neighborhood protection. This supports the complementary 
approach to understanding security practices. On the other 
hand, the data show that individual level security 
provision is substitutional with respect to contributions 
to municipal security, since residents taking more security 
measures at the individual level are less likely to support 
tax referenda for law enforcement at the municipal level. 
These two seemingly opposite findings add to the complexity 
of the problem of security provision. Also, the lack of 
relationship between paying MNA dues and electoral support 
for the municipal level referenda supports the idea that 
more exploration must be done beyond offering the 
parsimonious theory that security provision is
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complementary at all levels. The problem of security 
cannot be understood through substitutional or 
complementary arguments alone.
Psychological
The psychological explanation of security provision 
views security as a product of the absence of fear. The 
hypotheses in this section examine the relationship between 
fear of crime and adoption of different types of practices 
related to security. Table 3.13 presents zero-order 
correlations between fear of crime and the number of 
avoidance measures taken. Hypothesis 4a predicted a strong 
positive relationship between fear of crime and the number 
of avoidance measures taken. Hypothesis 4b predicted a 
weak positive relationship between fear of crime and the
Table 3.13
Correlation Table of Fear of Victimization, Number of 






avoidance X, .313*' 1.000
measures Xj
Number of
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number of protective measures taken. Fear of crime is 
strongly related to the number of avoidance measures taken 
(r = .313, p = .0002) but there is no significant 
relationship between fear of victimization and the number 
of protective measures taken (r = .050, p = .577) .
Hypothesis 5 predicted that fear of crime will not be 
related significantly to neighborhood association
Table 3.14
Crosstabulation of Fear of Victimization and Pavment of MNA
Dues





Pays Neighborhood 40.00% 20.63%




X- = 2.4 66
Probability Xt = .116
membership. Table 3.14 shows that fear of crime is not 
related significantly to payment of neighborhood 
association dues. Though the relationship is positive, 
the strength of the relationship is not statistically 
significant. I interpret this finding as the Midtown 
Neighborhood Association being viewed as a protective 
measure which is less influenced by fear of crime.
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Tables 3.15a-c show that individuals who fear crime 
mere strongly are not significantly more likely to support 
the security tax referenda. These findings contradict
Table 3.15a
Crosstabulation of Fear of Victimization and Vote in the 
January, 1992 Tax Referendum
Vote in January 
1992 Sheriff's 
Tax Election
















Crosstabulation of Fear of Victimization and Vote in the 
July, 1992 Tax Referendum
Afraid to Walk Alone at 
Night in Neighborhood
Vote in July 
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Table 3.15c
Crosstabulation of Fear of Victimization and Vote in the
October. 1993 Tax Referendum
Afraid to Walk Alone at 
Night in Neighborhood
















hypothesis 6 , which predicted a positive relationship 
between fear and electoral support for the referenda.
Political ideology may have a stronger effect on anti­
tax sentiment than law and order issues. Self-described 
conservatives were significantly more likely to vote 
against the first municipal tax referendum and were nearly 
so (p = .102) in the second election. While race has often 
been described as synonymous with politics in the South, 
Midtown residents' attitude about black influence in the 
life and politics of Baton Rouge is not significantly 
related to electoral decisions in the security tax against 
the first municipal tax referenda and were nearly so (p = 
.102) in the second election. While race has often been 
described as synonymous with politics in the South, Midtown
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residents' attitude about black influence in the referenda. 
Therefore, describing opposition to the tax based on 
opposition to funding security in other neighborhoods may 
not be a viable explanation for opposition to the policing 
tax referenda.
Table 3.16




1 . 0 0 0 X:
Black Influence X; . 190* 1.000 Xj
Jan. '92 Vote X] .2 2 2 * .092 1.000 X,
July '92 Vote X< .189 .034 .862" 1 . 0 0 0
Oct. '93 Vote X5 .094 .130 .511** .421"
Xc
'p<. 05
"p< . 0 1
The psychological approach explains only a very small 
part of the problem of security. Fear of victimization 
fails to explain the adoption of protective security 
measures, membership in a neighborhood security 
association, and voting behavior on security issues. Fear 
of crime does seem to be related to the number of avoidance 
measures taken.
Stratification
Table 3.17 shows a lack of relationship between life 
course status characteristics and household security
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measures. Hypotheses 8 a, 8b, 9a, and 9b were not supported 
as correlation coefficients are very low, suggesting that 
being married or having children residing in the 
respondent's home apparently does not affect the number of
Table 3.17
Correlation Table of Family Status Characteristics, Number
of Avoidance Measures Taken, and Number of Protective
Measures Taken
X:
Married X-, 1.000 X,
Children Xn .270’* 1.000 X,
Number of Avoidance
Measures X, -.022 -.052 1.000 X.
Number of Protective 
Measures X.; .009 .028 .209' 1.000
’d < . 05
"p< . 0 1
Table 3.18a
Crosstabulation of Resoondent's Marital Status and Payment
of MNA Dues
















Probability X~ = .554
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Table 3.18b
Crosstabulation of Presence of Children in the Home and MNA
Dues Pav'TT.ent
= 1.550 
Probability Xr = .213







Pavs Neighborhood 28.13% 22.22%







avoidance or protective measures taken. These findings 
question the impact of altruistic fear on household level 
security actions.
There is also no significant relationship between 
marital status, the presence of children, or educational 
attainment, and membership in the community security 
organization (Tables 3.18a, 3.18b).
As hypothesis 10c predicts, there is no significant 
relationship between educational attainment and 
neighborhood association membership. However, I note the 
direction of education on payment of MNA dues (r=-.15) . 
Education is not a life course status characteristic. It 
is a socioeconomic status characteristic. Those
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respondents with more education are less likely to pay MNA
dues.
Hypothesis 11 predicted that there would be no 
relationship between tax liability and electoral support 
for the tax referenda. Residents with parish property tax 
liability are often more likely to vote against property 
taxes than those residents owning property valued at less 
than $75,000. In this case, residents who are exempt from 
parish property tax were more likely to vote for the tax. 
Like much of the data, the first two elections that 
involved similar outcomes operate similarly (tables 3.19a 
and 3.19b). The January parishwide sheriff's election v/as 
voted down like the July citywide police election. Though 
the homestead exemption has a significant effect in both 
elections, it is interesting to note that the homestead 
exemption covers parish property taxes and does not exempt 
residents from city property taxes. All property owners 
are assessed the property tax millage in the July, 1992 
election. Those with parish tax liability have higher tax 
assessments and greater city property tax liability.
Inferences drawn from this finding may be limited due to 
the lack of testing other socioeconomic status variables.
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Table 3.19a
Crosstabulation of Parish Property Tax Status and Vote in
January. 1992 Tax Referendum
Exempt from Parish 
Property Taxes


















Crosstabulation of Parish Property Tax Status and Vote in 
July, 1992 Tax Referendum
Exempt from Parish 
Property Taxes

















Though Midtown neighborhood residents are significantly 
more affluent than the average Baton Rouge community and 
more likely to support the municipal policing tax millages,
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Table 3.19c
Crosstabulation of Parish Property Tax Status and Vote in
October. 1993 Tax Referendum
Exempt From Parish 
Property Taxes

















residents with greater tax liability in the community are 
more likely to oppose the tax millages. The October, 1993 
election does not show a statistically significant 
relationship but is in the predicted direction.
In analyzing the city and parish elections, there was 
no significant relationship between the life course status 
characteristics of being married or the presence of 
children in the home. Educational attainment shows a 
marginally significant positive relationship with support 
for the first tax election (r = .2 1 1 , p = .060) and the 
second tax election (r = .226, p = .048).
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Table 3.20a
Crosstabulation of Respondents Marital Status and Vote in
January. 1992 Tax Referendum.
Married Head of 
Household
Yes No
Vote in January 
1992 Sheriff's* 
Tax Election












Crosstabulation of Respondents Marital Status and Vote in 
July. 1992 Tax Referendum
Married Head of 
Household
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Table 3.20c
Crosstabulation of Respondents Marital Status and Vote in
October. 1993 Tax Referendum
Married Head of 
Household













=  . 1 1 1
Table 3.21a
Crosstabulation of Presence of Children in the Home and 
Vote in January. 1992 Tax Referendum
Children Residing 
in Household















X' = 0.450 
Probability = .502
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Table 3.21b
Crosstabulation of Presence of Children in the Home and
Vote in July, 1992 Tax Referendum
Children Residing 
in Household















Probability Xr = .896
Table 3.21c
Crosstabulation of Presence of Children in the Home and 




Vote in October 
1993 Sheriff's 
Tax Election
Xr = 1.328 
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Table 3.22




1 . 0 0 0 X,
Jan. '92 Vote X, .211 1 . 0 0 0 X 3
July '92 Vote X 3 .226" .862" 1 . 0 0 0 X,
Oct. '93 Vote 
'p< .05
"p< . 0 1
X, .093 . 611" .421" 1 . 0 0 0
While life course status characteristics do not appear 
to be related significantly to security provision, 
socioeconomic status characteristics merit further study. 
However, the effect of socioeconomic status is not easy to 
determine owing to the homogeneity of the neighborhood. 
Status characteristics of neighborhoods are related to 
differences in neighborhoods' abilities to organize and 
respond to crime (Skogan, 1990).
The Midtown neighborhood is more affluent than most 
other neighborhoods in the city and parish, supporting an 
ongoing neighborhood protection program and showing greater 
than average support for municipal policing tax referenda. 
The socioeconomic status argument of Wilson and Banfield 
also receives some support from the finding that more 
educated respondents are more likely to pay MNA dues and 
support increased taxes for municipal policing
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improvements. However, socioeconomic status is not a 
consistent explanation owing to the negative relationship 
between tax liability and support for the same tax 
referenda.
Social Networks
Surprising results were found in examining the 
relationship between Midtown resident's neighborhood 
networks and household security provision. Better 
integrated residents are more likely to associate with 
their neighbors. Hypothesis 13a predicted that individuals 
who were more integrated into the community would take 
fewer avoidance measures, while hypothesis 13b predicted no 
relation between integration and number of household 
protective measures. An individual's network size is 
measured by the number of associates in the area listed in 
response to social network questions. Network size is a 
dimension of range (Campbell, Marsden and Hurlbert, 1986), 
or a measure of access to potential resources and 
integration. The larger the network the more potential 
resources.
Integration is not related to the number of avoidance 
measures taken (r = -.001, p = .994). This may be a 
product of opposing causal mechanisms. The safety of 
familiarity within an area and the knowledge of 
neighborhood gossip about crime victimization may work in
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opposite directions to cancel any overall effects of 
integration. However, the degree of interpersonal 
integration into the community social network is related to 
the number of protective measures taken. The more 
integrated a community resident is, the fewer protective 
measures they take (r = -.253, p .007) . Though some may 
argue that residents less integrated in the community are 
more likely to take protective measures because limited 
knowledge of the area increases uncertainty and fear (Warr, 
1990), fear is not related significantly to the number of 
protective measures taken. Instead, I suggest that less 
integrated individuals are less likely to use their 
neighbors as security resources. Trust in neighbors leads 
to less reliance on other forms of protection.
Table 3.23
Correlation Table of Number of Associates in Area Listed by 
Respondent. Number of Avoidance Measures Taken and Number 
of Protective Measures Taken
X.
Number of
Associates in X, 1.000
Area Xg
Number of
avoidance X. - . 0 0 1 1 . 0 0 0
measures Xj
Number of
protective X3 -.253" .209' 1.000
measures
■p<. 05
"p< . 0 1
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Though I expected to find that integrated residents 
would be more likely to contribute to their neighborhood 
association, the data show no significant relationship 
between integration in the community social network and 
paying MNA dues (r=.085). The MNA is not composed 
primarily of individuals with friends in the neighborhood. 
Hypothesis 15 predicted no relationship between integration 
and electoral support for the tax referenda. This 
hypothesis is supported. Integration in the community does 
not lead to support for, or against municipal policing 
referenda.
Table 3.24
Correlation Table of Number of Associates in Area Listed bv




Area X. 1.000 X.
Pays MNA Dues X, .085 1.000 X]
Jan. '92 Vote X3 . 0 2 0 .076 1.000 X,
July '92 Vote X, .067 .007 .862** 1 . 0 0 0 Xs




Multivariate analysis is used to examine the extent to 
which psychological, stratification, and social network
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factors affect support for each level of security. First, 
micro-level security practices are considered, followed by 
multivariate models for community and municipal security 
actions. Table 3.25 shows that fear of victimization is 
related significantly to the avoidance index while other 
variables are not significantly related to avoidance.
Table 3.25
Rearession of Avoidance Measures on Selected Variables
Independent Unstandardized Std. Prob > T
Variable Coefficient Error
Intercept 3.41 0.81 0 . 0 0 1
Walk alone at night 0.13" 0.27 0.008
Trust local govt. -0 . 2 2 0.15 0.126
Black influence -0 . 1 2 0 . 1 0 0.250
Married -0.03 0 . 2 1 0.895
Children in home -0.06 0.24 0.796
Education 0 . 0 2 0.04 0.601
tf assoc, in area 0 . 0 1 0.04 0.796
Respondent's age 0.03 0.04 0.496
R- = .151
F = 2.106
Prob > F .043
Variance inflation factor coefficients are all below 1.5
suggesting no significant collinearity problem among
independent variables.
p < .05
" p < .01
Table 3.26 presents a regression of the index of 
protective measures on selected independent variables. 
While adding a few more variables could allow the 
multivariate model to approach a higher level of
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significance, I present a simple model for two reasons. 
First, this model presents a direct comparison to the 
analysis of avoidance measures taken. Second, with a small 
number of cases, assumptions made on any finding with a 
larger number of independent variables would be 
questionable. While fear of victimization affects the 
number of avoidance measures taken, fear is not related to 
the number of protective measures taken.
One relationship that merits further study is the 
negative association between the number of neighbor- 
associates and the number of protective measures taken.
This zero-order relationship remains after controlling for 
the other exogenous factors in the multiple regression 
model: those residents listing more neighbors as associates 
took fewer protective measures. The relationship between 
fear of victimization and number of protective measures 
taken remains insignificant. This lack of relationship 
leads me to question the effect of the neighborhood social 
network on protective security measures. Where Skogan 
(1977) claimed that integration into the neighborhood leads 
to greater fear of crime through increased neighborhood 
gossip and knowledge about crimes committed in the 
neighborhood, I claim that fear of victimization is not a 
mediating effect in the integration - security 
relationship.
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Table 3.26
Regression of Protective Measures on Selected Variables
Independent Unstandardized Std. Frob > T
Variable Coefficient Error
Intercept 12.50' 1.33 0 . 0 0 1
Walk alone at night -0.28 0.44 0.532
Trust local govt. -0.34 0.24 0.163
Black influence 0.07 0.17 0.681
Married 0.19 0.34 0.573
Children in home -0.48 0.40 0.233
Education 0.06 0.07 0.379
# assoc, in area -0.15' 0.07 0.034
Respondent's age 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 2 0
R- = .134
F = 1.746
Prob > F .099
Variance inflation factor coefficients are all below 1.5




Because the model analyzing payment of MNA dues is not 
significant (F Value = 0.466, p = .890), its results cannot 
be interpreted. Controlling for several variables in the 
multiple regression model duplicates the failure of zero- 
order analysis which failed to show any significant 
relationship between paying MNA dues and any variable in 
this study. I find no support for the hypothesis that fear 
of victimization and integration in a social network of 
neighbors contributes to the maintenance of community 
organizations.
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Table 3.27
Logistic Regression of Association Membership on Selected 
V a i a b 10 S
Independent Parameter Std. Prob >
Variable Estimate Error Chi-Square
Intercept 2.98 3.20 0.352
Walk alone at night -0.72 0.84 0.390
Trust local govt. 0.04 0.57 0.950
Black influence 0 . 1 0 0.37 0.798
Married 0.45 0 . 8 6 0.600
Children in home 1.40* 0.77 0.068
Education 0.13 0.15 0.379
# assoc, in area 0.03 0.14 0.849
Prop, tax exemption -0 . 0 2 0.28 0.957
Cons. Pol. ideology -0. 87 0.76 0.249
9 degrees of freedom
-2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square for
Covariates = 31.11 (p *< .0 0 1 )
p < .10 p < .05 "* p < .01
Once again, relationships among variables predicting 
support for each of the three tax referenda are similar in 
most respects. Fear of victimization has a near­
significant effect on voting decisions in the October 1993 
election but not on decisions in the other elections.
Trust in local government also yields ambiguous results. 
Though electoral support for the January and July elections 
are strongly related, their relationship with trust in 
local government differs as trust in government appears to 
be a more salient issue in the sheriff's elections (January 
1992 and October 1993) than the city police election (July 
1992) .
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Education shows a marginal or significant positive 
relationship in each model. However, I must note that the 
variability in socioeconomic dimensions such as education 
is low. In analyzing the tax votes, I added one variable, 
property tax exempt status, to each of the models, and 
eliminated respondent's age, which showed no significant 
relationship in voting for the referenda. Property tax 
liability is significant in two out of three elections.
The positive coefficient for property tax liability 
indicates that those who are tax exempt are more likely to 
vote in favor of increased taxes.
Table 3.28
Loaistic Rearession of Vote in Januarv 1992 tax referendum
on Selected Variables
Independent Parameter Std. Prob >
Variable Estimate Error Chi-Square
Intercept 4.09 3 .39 0.228
Walk alone at night 0.60 0 . 0 2 0.553
Trust local govt. 1.82"' 0 . 66 0.006
Black influence -0.09 0.37 0.809
Married 1.55 1.05 0.139
Children in home -1.30 0.82 0 . 1 1 0
Education 0.35" 0.17 0.039
# assoc, in area 0 . 0 2 0.14 0.902
Prop, tax exemption 1 .6 8" 0.77 0.030
Cons. Pol. ideology -0.55 0.34 0.105
9 degrees of freedom
-2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square for
Covariates = 31.11 (p < .0 0 1 )
p < .10 p < .05 "• p < .01
Other variables in the models do not aid in explaining
voting behavior. Life course status characteristics of
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marriage and children residing in the home offer no 
predictive value. The neighborhood network variable is
Table 3.29 
Loaistic Rearession of Vote in Julv 1992 tax referendum on
Selected Variables
Independent Parameter Std. Prob >
Variable Estimate Error Chi-Square
Intercept -1.35 2.93 0.646
Walk alone @ night 0.43 0.93 0.642
Trust local govt. 0.15 0.45 0.737
Black influence -0.05 0.33 0.886
Married -0.08 0.73 0.918
Children in home 0.20 0.67 0.7 67
Education 0.34" 0.15 0.021
# assoc, in area -0.16 0.14 0.272
Prop, tax exemption 1. 62” 0.66 0.015
Cons. Pol. ideology -0.03 0.24 0.886
9 degrees of freedom
-2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square for
Covariates = 17.59 (p = .040)
• p < .10 p < .05 p < .01
Table 3.30
Loaistic Rearession of Vote in October 1993 tax referendum
on Selected Variables
Independent Parameter Std. Prob >
Variable Estimate Error Chi-Square
Intercept 3.69 4.16 0.376
Walk alone 0 night 2.10' 1.13 0.063
Trust local govt. 1.54' 0.83 0.065
Black influence 0.04 0.47 0.928
Married -1.33 1.23 0.277
Children in home -1.00 0.94 0.286
Education 0.40' 0.21 0.054
# assoc, in area -0.15 0.17 0.391
Prop, tax exemption 1.42 0.92 0.123
Cons. Pol. ideology 0.38 0.34 0.265
9 degrees of freedom 
-2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square for 
Covariates = 19.52 (p = .021)
* p < .10 p < .05 *” p < .01
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also unrelated to voting decisions. Opinions on black 
influence in government are insignificant and conservative 
political ideology loses its zero-order significance when 
placed in a model with other control variables.
Discussion
Analysis of Midtown residents' survey responses 
supports my claim that security provision is not a simple 
matter of complementarity or substitutionality. Though 
security may be perceived as freedom from threat, fear of 
victimization is not related significantly to support for, 
or adoption of several types of security measures. At the 
household level, fear of victimization influences avoidance 
measures but is not related to the number of protective 
measures taken. Adoption of a greater number of protective 
measures is related to knowing more neighbors.
The major puzzle is the absence of any significant 
associations with Midtown Neighborhood Association dues 
paying. Possibly, the structure of the organization 
creates a set of influences that are unique from that of 
other organizations. The recent growth of organizations 
which require monetary contributions and no time commitment 
is a field which deserves more study (Putnam, 1995).
Electoral support for the municipal property tax 
millages varies slightly across the three elections.
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however, I find that life course status characteristics 
such as education and property tax liability are be related 
to electoral decisions.
Overall, the psychological approach to understanding 
security contributes to understanding micro-level avoidance 
behaviors, the social network perspective contributes to 
understanding micro-level protective behaviors, and the 
stratification approach aids in understanding the macro­
level municipal tax referenda voting behaviors. Rational 
choice theory, which is designed to explain collective 
goods provision through a combination of psychological, 
social network, and stratification factors, fails to 
explain the meso-level behavior of membership in the 
Midtown Neighborhood association.
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CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION
Introduction
Fear of crime is significantly related to individuals' 
personal avoidance measures. Having a greater number of 
associates in the neighborhood was related to taking fewer 
protective measures in and around the home. No variables 
were signigficantly related to support for contributions to 
the community crime-prevention organization other than a 
positive relationship between household measures and dues 
payment. Trust in local government, educational 
attainment, and tax-exempt status explains support for the 
tax millages.
In this chapter, I argue that security is not a simple 
concept. The primary argument of this dissertation is that 
security is a multi-level construct, and not a single 
variable. This multi-level construct has led numerous 
researchers to describe only a part of the problem of 
security. First, I will review the findings of this study 
which confirm that different variables influence various 
types of action which are taken to provide security. The 
psychological, stratification, social network, and rational 
choice approaches all fall short of presenting a unified 
explanation of all levels of security and the free rider 
problem. I present a modified interpretation of rational
118
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choice theory that incorporates the concept of trust as a 
necessary condition for understanding security and the free 
rider problem. I conclude this chapter with a summary of 
this dissertation, acknowledging this study's limitations 
and describing ways these ideas may be incorporated in the 
design of public policy.
People react to crime in individualized ways and the 
relationship between micro, meso, and macro level security 
behaviors cannot be described exclusively substitutional or 
complementary. A substitutional effect is found in the 
inverse relationship between security related measures in 
and around the house and support for municipal policing tax 
referenda. However, a complementary effect was observed 
between micro and meso levels: residents who take more 
household security measures are more likely to pay dues to 
the neighborhood association. This complementary 
relationship between support for security measures in the 
home and community is not surprising. Security at home and 
in the neighborhood is a more immediate concern than other 
areas of the city (Warr and Stafford, 1983). The 
complementary relationship between household and 
neighborhood is one of propinquity, whereas the 
substitutional relationship between household and municipal 
government is one of distance.
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None of the theoretical approaches succeeds in 
explaining all levels of security related behavior. 
Responses to crime can only be understood as a combination 
of individuals' crime- related concerns, the social and 
cultural context of the neighborhood, and the social and 
cultural context of the metropolitan area as a whole.
Review of Results 
Psychological Approach
The psychological approach explains only one aspect of 
Che problem of security. Fear is strongly related to 
individual avoidance measures but fails to explain 
individual protective measures, contributions to the 
neighborhood association, and electoral support for the 
first two policing-related tax referenda. Fear of crime is 
associated significantly with voting behavior in the 
successful tax referenda election.
Stratification Approach
Characteristics related to "traditional home and 
neighborhood life," such as marital status and the presence 
of children in the home are not related to adoption of any 
security practices.Tax liability predicts opposition to
Length of residence in the neighborhood was also not 
related to participation at any level. This finding casts 
doubt on the generalization that longer term residents of 
the neighborhood are more likely to build and support 
neighborhood institutions and promote stability (Kasarda 
and Janowitz, 1974). Stability of a neighborhood may just
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the tax referenda. Though education is not significantly 
related to membership in the community association, there 
is cause for further study of its relationship with 
security. Perhaps those with higher education were more 
likely to oppose the tax referenda, but this may be because 
they were more likely to own property that was not covered 
by the homestead exemption. Socioeconomic status may be a 
factor in the adoption of security measures. Those 
residents with city property tax liability were more likely 
to oppose all three tax referenda. The survey did not 
capture significant income variability among Midtown 
neighborhood residents.^*
Though citizens with conservative political ideologies 
are believed to have stronger anti-tax sentiments, crime
be an artifact of socioeconomic status. While length of 
residence positively affects a person's involvement in the 
social life of the neighborhood (Lewis and Salem, 1986; 
Sampson, 1988), I found that length of residence in the 
neighborhood was positively related to paying MNA dues (r = 
.29, p= .02) in a zero order relationship. This finding 
does not persist when controlling for other variables in 
the multiple regression analysis. Adding length of 
residence to the multiple regression models significantly 
improved the fit for the number of avoidance measures 
taken, but did not meaningfully contribute to models 
analyzing the number of protective measures and all of the 
tax referenda. Though adding length of residence in the 
neighborhood may have improved the fit of the model 
analyzing contributions to the MNA, this model does not 
approach significance (prob. F = .37).
Approximately 90% of the sample had household incomes 
above average.for East Baton Rouge Parish.
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and security-related issues are also salient issues for 
conservatives. The multivariate analyses in chapter three 
showed no relationship (controlling for other variables) 
between political ideology and vote in the tax referenda.’’ 
Though race has traditionally been called one of the 
most influential factors in Southern politics (Key, 1949; 
Black and Black, 1989; Carmines and Stimson, 1989), there 
is no relationship between a measure of racial beliefs and 
support for the policing tax referenda.
Social Network Approach
The social network perspective claims that relations 
between residents influence behavior. DuBow et al. (197 9) 
claimed that the relationship between social integration 
and collective response is the single most important factor 
in the study of security. However, social integration
’’ One complaint about the nature of policing in East Baton 
Rouge Parish was voiced several times. The city police and 
parish sheriff's deputies are often publicly criticized for 
wasting money through duplicating services. Several survey 
respondents recommended that the police services be 
consolidated. However, while this argument is supported by 
many, an argument can be made for not consolidating the 
police and sheriff's office. Larger departments are not 
more cost efficient. Several researchers have argued that 
service delivery is less efficient and per capita costs of 
police services are significantly higher in urban areas 
than suburban areas (Ostrom and Parks, 1973; Bish and 
Ostrom, 1979; Ostrom et al. 1973).
Though race related attitudes are difficult to measure, 
substituting other race related attitudes in the multiple 
regression model yielded similar (non-significant) results.
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affects only some types of security measures. When 
integration of the community is measured by the number of 
friends in the community, there is no relationship with the 
number of avoidance measures taken, but there is a 
significant relationship with the number of protective 
measures taken. Residents listing more neighbors as 
associates took fewer security measures. Danger comes from 
the unknown.
However, the findings do not support Podolefsky and 
DuBow's (1981) idea that group membership is linked to 
affective ties among neighbors. Those residents listing 
more associates residing in the neighborhood were not 
significantly more likely to take any type of action other 
than taking fewer protective measures. Contributions to 
the neighborhood organization cannot be explained as 
prescribed behavior from other residents. There appears to 
be no significant relationship between embeddedness in 
neighborhood life and voting behavior.
Rational Choice Approach
Because each dimension of security has a unique set of 
determinants, I suggest that rational choice theory 
provides the best explanation of security provision. The 
psychological approach fails to explain contributions to 
collective action. Tests of the stratification and social 
network approaches also fail to demonstrate a relationship
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between constraints and collective action related to 
security. Rational choice theory argues that actors in the 
system attempting to maximize their own profits from the 
costs and benefits of each security related action. This 
argument requires two assumptions : 1) Utility differs at 
micro, meso, and macro levels. 2) Trust in others is more 
influential than personal contact.
Neither Hechter's nor Coleman's ideas are supported 
because they do not account for utility differences among 
micro - macro levels and they misinterpret the concept of 
trust. I argue that trust in government has two aspects:
1) Citizens must believe that their tax dollars are not 
being squandered. 2) Citizens expect that others will 
contribute.
Familiarity is not trust (Luhmann, 1988).
Participating in the MNA requires more than confidence that 
the money will go to pay patrolling officers.
Contributions are given in the spirit of trust that others 
will contribute.''®
The free rider problem is not solved by familiarity, 
but by trust. Trust is a "we" feeling that may be 
developed through interpersonal exchange, but is also
One person's contribution would pay for less than one 
hour of patrolling each month for the entire neighborhood. 
The accumulation of contributions fund more effective 
patrolling.
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produced by reputation (Putnam, 1993) . Status 
characteristics are cues to trustworthiness. Newcomers to 
the community may purchase their homes in a community based 
on its reputation even though they do not know their 
neighbors.’’ Trust in institutions may be garnered through 
public relations campaigns. Participation depends on 
trust that the services will be delivered at a fair cost. 
Collective behavior may be studied as a rational process.
DeTocqueville discussed "enlightened self-interest," 
or self-interest, properly understood. Trust is the 
linkage of enlightened self-interest with the value of the 
good. Empirical tests of rational choice approaches lack 
an understanding of self-interest. I believe that some of 
the unexplained phenomenon of rational choice results from 
the lack of understanding of actors' constraints. The 
character and circumstances of self-interest change in 
trusting environments (Putnam, 1993). Because of the
I observed that residents newer to the neighborhood 
trust their neighbors and believe that crime comes from 
outside the neighborhood, even though they have not 
participated in a system of neighborly exchange. They lack 
repeated exchanges but still trust.
■*® Luhmann (1988) argues that trust is vital in personal 
relations, but not functional systems like government. I 
disagree, trust is very important in government. Mistrust 
and unequal taxation are themes of the popular political 
commentator Rush Limbaugh and one source of the meteoric 
rise of the right wing in mid-1990's American congressional 
politics, just as Huey Long and Edwin Edwards' populism was 
strongly supported by the electorate.
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systemic nature of rational choice theory, all hypotheses 
were tested in multiple regression models which control for 
other factors. Fear of walking alone at night was the sole 
significant variable related to the number of avoidance 
measures taken. In the model analyzing the number of 
preventive measures taken, the number of associates in the 
area listed by a resident, the fewer preventive measures 
they are likely to take. Needs are situational. Residents 
with knowledge about their neighbors are more likely to 
spot suspicious occurrences and sense a greater number of 
people looking after their homes. I find no significant 
variable related to paying dues in the Midtown Neighborhood 
association.
Analysis of each of the three tax referenda yield 
similar, but not identical, results. Property tax 
liability is significant in two out of the three elections. 
Those residents owning property valued below the homestead 
exemption were more likely to support the tax millages. 
Education is significant. Residents with higher 
educational attainment were more likely to support the tax 
referenda. My first inclination was to check the 
relationship between education and property tax liability. 
These two variables are not related (r = -.003, p = .970). 
Instead, just as educated respondents present racial 
beliefs through more publicly accepted ways, I claim that
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the most educated citizens exert their political influence 
through the electoral process. An educated person's 
protest takes place in the voting booth.
While trust in the local government was significant in 
the first election only, note that fear of walking alone at 
night is not significant in the first two elections but was 
significant in the third election. The third tax 
referendum differed was unique from the previous two in 
that the government mounted a large scale public relations 
campaign, explaining to the public exactly where the money 
would go. It would fund small raises for employees of the 
sheriff's office and allow for the operation of 144 more 
beds in the parish prison. This disclosure may have 
generated trust among the electorate and was a key factor 
in converting previously skeptical voters into supporters 
for the tax increase. This third election was also held in 
1993, more than one year after the two tragic shootings of 
the unarmed black men/*-
While Logan and Molotch (1987) propose that wealthier 
neighborhoods "work within the system," what we may be 
seeing is segregation leading to separate types of 
security. The MNA provides itself with police protection.
The third tax referenda used a public relations campaign 
which focused on the slogan "lock 'em up." This slogan 
presented a simple understanding of the problem that East 
Baton Rouge Parish needed to enhance its jail space.
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There is no organized political effort to procure more 
police for their own area (other than MNA protection), nor 
is there a struggle with less affluent areas (finger 
pointing, allegations that other neighborhoods get all the 
police). The MNA does not mobilize against the government. 
There is little evidence that Midtown residents believe 
they are struggling with other areas for more police 
patrolling because overall people are satisfied with the 
police. Few residents claim that other areas of the city 
receive a disproportionate amount of patrolling.
Theoretical Implications
While trust is a property of a system, behavior may be 
based on the value actors perceive in the exchange. While 
trustworthiness may encourage utilitarian actors to behave 
in a certain manner, there is no incentive for actors to 
invest more than the projected gain regardless of the 
social capital in the relationship (Hardin, 1992).
Trust relationships and dependencies vary at each 
level of security. At the individual level, security is 
gained by trust in others and faith that they will not be 
harmed. Taking an avoidance action is based on each 
individual's judgement of the situation. This dissertation 
supports Skogan and Maxfield's (1981) finding that
Only 34% of the respondents believed that the police 
paid less attention to Midtown than Baton Rouge as a whole
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avoidance follows fear as assessed by individual actors. 
Protective behaviors are related to trust in the 
environment around home. Neighbor trust is related to 
individual protective measures. Knowing the area reduces 
the field of the unknown which provides a greater feeling 
of security (Warr 1990; Hunter and Baumer, 1982; Skogan and 
Maxfield, 1981).
No variable is related to contribution to the Midtown 
Neighborhood Association. When asked about how the MNA 
succeeds, the most common response was that "people must be 
willing to pay their dues." There is no formal mechanism 
to create and maintain trust in the neighborhood. Trust is 
difficult to generate at this level and is considered a 
primary factor in the difficulty of beginning and 
maintaining successful community organizations.
In explaining the success of tax referenda for law 
enforcement, trust in government is essential. The 
taxpayers want to believe that tax dollars will be used for 
effective programs that are distributed and paid for in an 
equitable manner. Whether the government does enough or 
not enough for security, whether it spends money wisely or 
not, is a political debate that yields little fruit. The 
people speak as a collective through the electorate, as 
neighbors, and in the actions they take. United States
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citizens place a great deal of trust in politicians through 
its representative democratic system.
Familiarity is a key issue in security. Neighbors 
familiar with the area may notice odd occurrences in the 
area, and are more likely to report suspicious actions. 
Residents strongly supported the idea of having the same 
officers patrol the neighborhood throughout the year.^
One resident told of a story when a police officer thwarted 
a burglary attempt at her home because he noticed a strange 
car in the driveway. However, I suggest that familiarity 
does not create the "we" feeling which encourages 
contributions to the MNA.
Limitations of the Study
First, I must address the nature of the area studied. 
Urban life is unique from other areas in that it provides 
several alternatives for its residents (Fischer, 1982). 
Rural communities may not organize to provide patrolling, 
nor can they easily watch over their neighbors homes.
Also, though urban areas are made up of diverse populations 
which cut across all social classes, the population studied 
for this dissertation is a homogeneous, white, middle class 
community in a southern metropolitan area. The level of
Sixty-seven percent strongly agreed with the statement 
"It would be better if the same police officers patrolled 
this neighborhood." Ninety-three percent agreed at least 
somewhat.
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homogeneity allows for study beyond individual attributes 
of actors and facilitates analysis of a system, ceteris 
paribus.
Definitions of fear of crime vary with each 
conceptualization, potentially leading to different results 
(LaGrange and Ferraro, 1989) . Designing indices of 
avoidance and protective measures was a process of constant 
testing, retesting, adding variables, subtracting 
variables, and compromises. Using these indices may 
obscure the understanding of individual security practices 
such as gun ownership.
This dissertation offers no concrete solution to 
understanding contributions to the Midtown Neighborhood 
association. It is difficult to measure the value of each 
security measure for each individual. Those residents in 
the area not contributing to the MNA do not feel more or 
less safe (X- = 0.877, p = .645), therefore, I cannot say 
that the MNA provides a welfare good (Rich, 1980a).
Festinger et al., (1950) claimed that group membership 
may offer rewards in just belonging, rather than 
utilitarian benefits. However, though deference goods are 
more likely to operate in homogeneous communities (Keller, 
1968; Almy, 1975), people more integrated into neighborhood 
life are not more likely to contribute to the MNA. Even 
though the MNA is the provider of supplemental security and
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on the whole people feel good about the neighborhood and 
the MNA, there is competition for the security dollar 
outside of the neighborhood level.
Trust is a difficult concept to measure. Though 
repeated exchange may produce a spirit of trust (Coleman, 
1990a), this spirit of reciprocity is difficult to measure 
(Putnam, 1993}. The "we" feeling is a subjective 
evaluation based on personal judgements. Social networks 
do offer support but also may act as burdens (Kilburn,
1996). More empirical research should be done 
understanding neighborhood cultural influence on residents' 
actions in neighborhoods. Because the ability to mobilize 
and create a public good may depend on tie structure 
(Granovetter, 1973: Crenson, 1978), further research should 
go beyond the existence of ties and explore the structure 
of residents' social networks.
A common criticism of rational choice approaches, 
especially those attempting to assess maximization of 
utility, is that any preference may be hypothesized as the 
cause of any social outcome. The problem of studying 
"self-interest properly understood" is that understanding 
influential forces may be puzzling. Participation in 
voluntary organizations means different things to different 
people and there are many types of organizations that 
individuals may support (Wuthnow, 1991) .
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Implications for Professional Practice
Trust is the solution to the problem of order, and 
people vary in their reaction to others and propensity to 
trust others. Through these modifications of rational 
choice theory, we are best able to understand self- 
interest. While civic culture is developed through shared 
cooperation and action (Almond and Verba, 1963), security 
presents a dilemma in that there is no universally shared 
understanding of the problem. In security, taking 
individual measures in and around the home leads to 
decreased support for other types of measures in the city, 
but not from neighborhood life. Reich (1991) noted that 
more affluent communities are collecting private funds to 
provide supplemental services to their areas, calling this 
phenomena the "secession of the successful.However, 
contributions to the MNA do not replace support for 
municipal security related tax increases.
McKenzie (1994) notes that in 1992 America had over 
150,000 homeowner associations providing various services 
for over 32,000,000 people.
The development of community organizations challenges 
the Tiebout hypothesis that people move around the 
metropolis on a constant search for the "optimal" 
combination of governmental services and taxes. The city 
is abandoned when people cannot afford to move. This 
dissertation asserts that affluent members are willing to 
support raising their own taxes if the government justifies 
the increased expenditures.
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While civic engagement is often viewed as a 
dichotomous choice between self-interest and altruism, I 
suggest that civic engagement is created through trust in 
the good itself (technological trust), or trust in the 
agent delivering the good. Purposive action takes place 
when there is trust that the actors' needs are fulfilled, 
though needs and levels of trust among actors are variable. 
Trust is a property of a system and not just a personal 
attribute. Why would anybody own a gun at home and risk 
injury or accidents if they did not trust that it would 
protect them? Why would residents pay for alarm systems if 
they did not trust it would protect them? Gun owners trust 
that gun handlers will be responsible, just as consumers of 
alarm systems trust that the company they are dealing with 
is reliable.
Understanding collective behavior requires 
understanding actors' motives to cooperate (Williams,
1988). Rational choice is criticized, but motives can be 
generalized for network members possessing specific 
characteristics. Having these characteristics is not 
sufficient to understand security, but people sharing like 
characteristics are more likely to reside in similar 
geographic locations and hold similar beliefs.
Putnam (1993) suggests that building trust through 
repeated exchange leads to strong support for institutions.
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These institutions aid in creating a "we" feeling that 
further legitimates and perpetuates the existence of the 
institution. Isolates lack trust and do not visualize the 
payoff of contribution to collective goods.
Gaining the citizens' trust may sound simple, but it 
is difficult to do. People with lower status are more 
likely to view the government as illegitimate. Through 
public relations campaigns, the institution requesting 
support already has that "foot in the door" which leads to 
greater success for exchange and cooperation (Good, 1988).
Residents of Baton Rouge differ in their capacity for 
trusting the government. When Patrick Esco and Chauncey 
Thomas were shot to death by local law enforcement 
personnel, these incidents reduced levels of trust by the 
citizenry. Poor areas lacking social and political capital 
rely on themselves to supply security, protecting 
themselves with weapons as portable security systems.
A few years ago, some cars displayed bumper stickers 
with the slogan "pay police like your life depends on it." 
This slogan attempts to exploit fear to gain support for 
police and does little to build trust between the citizens 
and the police department. I argue that this campaign did 
little to develop citizens' trust in their police that is 
essential to support for additional resources.
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Peterson (1981) divided all public goods as being 
administered through developmental and redistributive 
policies. Developmental policies are based on competition 
with other communities and are focused on improving the 
entire area. These developmental policies help attract 
business to the area and improve the area's national 
standing in quality of life assessments. Redistributive 
policies redistribute resources from the wealthier to those 
of lesser means. Voters are likely to support an election 
if they view the issue as developmental, benefitting 
everyone, and not redistributive, in which the affluent pay 
most of the taxes and the less-affluent receive most of the 
benefit (Weaver and Parent, 1994; Button, 1992; Hahn and 
Kamieneki, 1987). I expected to find that residents 
perceiving the greatest amount of inequitable governmental 
service delivery will be most likely to oppose tax 
millages. Homogeneous white areas may possibly view 
municipal security as an issue in which some residents are 
paying high taxes for extra policing in high crime (or 
black) neighborhoods. The third tax referenda's appeal to 
lock up criminals and provide more jail space appeared to 
reach the white middle class voters of the Midtown area. 
There was a greater perceived benefit in creating more jail
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space than raising officers' pay, even though the third 
referendum did provide money for employee raises.
The root of tax and governmental service equity is 
Louisiana's tax system. Sales taxes are paid by all and 
property taxes are paid primarily by business and partially 
by those owning property valued in excess of $75,000. 
Opponents of high sales taxes claim that they are 
regressive, with the poor paying a disproportionate share 
of their income. Opponents of higher property taxes claim 
that business and the affluent bear too much of the 
taxation b u r d e n . F o r  property tax millages, an appeal 
must be made to more affluent residents of the city. Those 
responsible for property taxes must develop trust in the 
government by being convinced that they will receive 
benefits which outweigh the costs. Though residents in 
Midtown have joined together to pay dues, the MNA is no 
substitute for the criminal justice system. Neighborhood 
organizations do not threaten support for governmental 
programs.
For the less affluent, trust must be made through the 
value of the governmental service. The wealthier must be
-■* Gov. Earl Long popularized his description of the 
Louisiana electorate with the slogan "Don't tax you. Don't 
tax me. Tax that guy behind the tree."
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sold on the idea that they will pay for and receive a fair 
share of the services.
A shortcoming of my argument is that trust is not 
concrete. Trust can only be operationalized in a 
situational context. Assessments of preferences and 
constraints are highly subjective (Hechter et al., 1990). 
However, I assert that social scientists must look in the 
direction of the value of goods and trust in the related 
system.
In neighborhoods, even a small percentage of committed 
residents can make an impact on neighborhood life. In 
politics, 50% plus one vote is a victory. While I do not 
explain the actions of every actor, I provide a direction 
which may reach many of the people.
This dissertation presents a methodological challenge. 
Assigning values to goods and measuring trust will not be 
an easy task, but I assert that this is the foundation to 
understanding the problem of security, and hence, one 
aspect of the problem of order.
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Did Not 24 52 76
Contact 29.30% 28.10% 28.50%
82 185 267
151
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SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
One hundred thirty-seven surveys were completed for 
this study. A total of 282 confirmed addresses in the area 
were sent letters of introduction and approached to be 
surveyed. In the process, 15 houses (5.3%) were confirmed 
to be vacant. Of the 267 inhabited households, 137 (51.3%) 
completed the survey, 46 (17.2%) directly refused our 
interviewer, 8 (3.0%) broke two or more appointments to be 
interviewed, 21 (7.9%) homes were believed to have someone 
inside but did not open their door, and 55 (20.6%) were not 
contacted in at least four attempts.
Of the entire survey sample, 90 homes were not listed 
as eligible for membership in the Midtown Neighborhood 
Association. Eight (8.9%) of these were vacant. Of the 82 
inhabited households not eligible for membership in the 
Midtown Neighborhood Association, 41 (50%) completed the 
survey, 14 (17.1%) directly refused our interviewer, 3 
(3.7%) broke two or more appointments to be interviewed, 8 
(9.8%) homes were believed to have someone inside but did
In order to increase response rates and ensure 
interviewer safety, interviewers did not attempt to 
interview at night.
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not open their door, and 16 (19.5%) were not contacted in 
at least four attempts.
One hundred and ninety-two homes in the sample were 
eligible for membership in the Midtown Neighborhood 
Association. Seven (3.6%) of these homes were vacant. Of 
the 185 inhabited households eligible for membership in the 
Midtown Neighborhood Association, 96 (51.9%) completed the 
survey, 32 (17.3%) directly refused our interviewer, 5 
(2.7%) broke two or more appointments to be interviewed, 13 
(7.0%) were believed to have someone inside but did not 
open the door, and 39 (21.1%) were not contacted in at 
least four attempts.
Table A.3
1990 U.S. Census characteristics of block group which 
contains Midtown neighborhood
Population - 740 
white population - 732 
black population - 0 
other population - 8 
number of households - 331
median year housing structure was built - 1952
white female headed households with children - 1.8%
white female headed households with no children - 4.2%
median household income (for 1989) - $ 36,544
per capita income (for 1989) - $ 18,014
white per capita income - $ 18,014
black per capita income - 0
public assistance per household - 0
whites over age 25 with HS diploma (includes GED) - 518 
white individuals living in poverty - 6




Hiâtory of SaCon Rouae Tax Elections
Pass-Failed
April 1987 17 mills Sewerage improvements f
May 1987 2 mills Park operations P
May 1987 5 mills School operations P
May 1987 6 mills School employee raise P
May 1987 .5 mills Anti-drug program P
Nov 1987 Indefinite Sewerage improvement f
April 1988 1/2 cent sales Sewerage improvement P
May 1990 1/2 cent Street repairs P
Jan 1992 7 mills Sheriff's office operation f
April 1992 10 mills School operations f
April 1992 8 mills School employee raises f
April 1992 2 mills School books f
April 1992 .25 mills I Care (anti-drug) P
July 1992 14 mills police/fire operation f
Oct. 1993 7.5 mills police/prison P




S-> L.A, ^  W< A if City Polies Dispatches for 1990 and 1993
Baton Rouge District 2A
1990 1993 1990 1993
Burglary 9,798 9,242 876 946
Shootings or shots 
fired
1,778 3,242 152 293
Stabbings 357 281 36 30
Armed Robberies 533 1,094 50 80
Table A.6
Police Dispatches bv Subdistrict, Mav 1992 - Mav 1993
(Midtown is centrally located in this area making up about 
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Zero-Order Correlation Table of Protective Measures
X,
Installed Alarm X,
Install Dead Bolts X,














-.040 .010 1.000 X,
-.029 .138 .219' 1.000
- .034
X.,
075 -.028 -.120 1.000 X,
.035 .251" .251" .055 .117 1.000 X,
.051 .402" .012 .099 -.113 .112 1.000 X.







INTERVIEW MAIN OWNER/RENTER OR SPOUSE. USING PENCIL, CIRCLE NUMBER OR 
ENTER CORRECT ANSWER. CIRCLE "MISSING" IF DON'T KNOW, NO RESPONSE, 
CAN'T SAY.
Midtown 1 ( 1)
ID  (3-6)
Interviewer N a m e : ________________________________________   (8-9)
STREET ADDRESS ______________________  (11-16)
ADDRESSEE ___________________________   (18-21)
Dates/Time of attempted contact?
First Try __________ ___________
Second _________  ___________
Third __________ ___________
Fourth______ _________  ___________
Date of Interview:
_______________ 19____   (23-24)
(date) (month) (year)  (26-27)
 (29-30)
Reason for non-interview:
1. no one home in 4 calls
2. someone seems to be at home, but no one answers the door
3. direct refusal.
4. Indirect refusal. Always too busy, two or more broken appointments
5. Respondent does not speak English
6. Dwelling was vacant— no one living there.  (32)
ReprocJucecJ with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproctuction prohibitect without perm ission.
1 5 8
Introduction
Hello— I'm a student at LSU in the Department of Sociology.
We ' re doing a neighborhood study of the Midtown area. Are you the 
man/woman of the house? ((If yes, continue ; If no, ask to speak to 
him/her))
Did you get our letter about this? ((IF TES..continue; IF 
NO..give copy of letter first}).
As the letter says we're interested in the quality of people's 
lives and the quality of life in their communities. You can call the 
Department at LSU (388-1645) to confirm ray identity, or you can ask
the other students who are interviewing other people up and down the
street right now.
I ' 11 be asking you about life in this neighborhood and the kinds of 
things you do to protect yourself and your family. This is a 
volunteer study being conducted by students. It's not an ordinary 
survey. It's more interesting because it's not just etbout you but 
about the people you know, and about topics such as crime. As that 
letter explained, I would like to ask some questions of a member of 
your household. The interview should take about 20 minutes.
First, in order to figure out who is eligible for this interview, I 
need to get an idea of who lives here.
1. The name we had from the phone book was [ADDRESSEE). Is that
correct?
l.Yes 2.No  (34)
2. So you are ? (WRITE NAME) 
(ask IF NECESSARY)
3. How many adults live here? ______   (36)
4. How many children live here? _______  (38)
5. How many of these children are under 12? _____  (40)
Who to interview?
IF BOTH MAN & WOMAN ARE PRESENT, TALK TO THE PERSON WHO SPENDS THE 
MOST TIME AT HOME. IF ONE IS RELUCTANT, INTERVIEW THE OTHER. IF THE 
PERSON YOU'RE TALKING TO IS NOT THE MAIN MAN/WOMAN OF THE HOUSE, DO 
NOT COMPLETE THE INTERVIEW. THANK HIM/HER AND ASK FOR A GOOD TIME TO 
RETURN.
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6. In what year did you first begin living in this home? 19
 (42- 43)
7. Did you grow up in (Circle all that apply)
Louisiana? Y N ___(45)
Baton Rouge? Y N ___(47)
this neighborhood? Y N ___(49)
this house/apt? Y N ___(51)
8. How long have you lived in (enter years)
_______ Louisiana  (53-54)
_______ Baton Rouge  (56-57)
_______ this neighborhood  (59-60)
_______ this house/apt  (62-63)
THE NEIGHBORHOOD
"These first questions are about the neighborhood."
9. Some people feel that their neighborhood is a real home to them, 
while others think of it as just a place where they happen to be 
living. Which one of those comes closest to the way you consider this 
neighborhood, a real home or ]ust a place to live.
1. real home 2. ]ust a place to live (9.missing)  (65)
10. How likely is it that you might move out of this neighborhood 
within the next couple of years?
1.definitely 2.probably 3.probably won't 4.definitely won't
(9.missing) ___(67)
11. Supposing that for some reason you had to move away from the 
Midtown area, how sorry would you be to leave?
1. Very sorry 2. Somewhat sorry 3. Not too sorry
4. Not at all sorry (9. missing)  (69)
12. How often do the following things happen around here?
HAND RESPONDENT CARD "A" with responses: 1.often 2. sometimes
3. rarely 4. never. (Circle 9 if missing.)
a) You hear loud noises from the street when you're inside ___(71)
1 2 3 4 9
b) People walk down this street that aren't from around here
 (73)
1 2 3 4 9
c) Neighbors play music too loud, have late parties, or quarrels
 (75)
1 2 3 4 9
d) People leave litter or trash around the area  (77)
1 2 3 4 9
e) People don't take care of their property or lawn  (79)
1 2 3 4 9
f) Purse snatching, robbery, or other street crimes_________ ___(1)
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((RESPONSES ARE: 1. Often 2. Sometimes 3. Rarely 4.Never
(9.missing))
g) Gunshots  12)
1 2 3 4 9
hi You see drug dealers or users on the street ___(5)
1 2 3 4 9
1 ) You see homeless people ___(7)
1 2 3 4 9
iI Families let their children get out of control ___(9)
1 2 3 4 9
k) People are loud or disorderly  (11)
1 2 3 4 9
I) You personally have hassles or conflicts with people living in the 
area
1 2 3 4 9  (13)
13. Do you have any worries about safety when you see young kids— I 
mean kids under 12— playing outside around here?
1. Yes 2. No (9.missing) ___ (15)
14. Thinking of the Midtown area as a whole, how many of the people 
who live around here can be trusted?
1. almost all 2. most can 3. about half  (17)
4. most can't 5. almost no one (9.missing)
15. How many neighbors do you know by name? By neighbors I mean 
anyone up and down the block.
l.all 2.nearly all 3.most 4.about half
5.some 6.not many 7.none
(9.missing) ___ (19)
16. How many neighbors do you know by sight?
l.all 2.nearly all 3.most 4.about half
5.some 6.not many 7.none (9.missing) ____ (21)
17. Thinking about your adult friends that you have now, how many of 
them would you say live in this neighborhood?
1. nearly all 2. most 3. a few 4. none
(9. missing) (23)
18. How often do you do the following things in this neighborhood?
HAND CARD "A" TO RESPONDENT with responses: 1. often 2. sometimes
3. rarely 4. never (9. missing)
a) you borrow something small from neighbors  (25)
1 2 3 4 9
b) your neighbors borrow something small from you  (27)
1 2 3 4 9
c) you greet or talk to people you don't know very well  (29)
1 2 3 4 9
d) you visit with neighbors informally at home  (31)
1 2 3 4 9
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((RESPONSES ARE: 1. Often 2. Sometimes 3. Rarely 4.Never
(9.missing))
e) you have picnics, parties, or bar-b-que's with neighbors ___ (33)
1 2 3 4 9
19. Taking all your adult relatives and in-laws, except the very 
distant ones, how many of them live in this neighborhood?
1.nearly all 2.most 3.a few 4.none
(9. missing)  (35)
20. Thinking about the people that live around here, do you sometimes 
wish there were more people in the neighborhood you could talk or get
together with; or do you feel OK about the way things are?
1. more people 2.O.K. (9.missing) ____ (37)
21. What about having people you can rely on to look after your house
and your things when you're out or away. Do you sometimes wish you
knew more people like that; or do you feel OK about the way things 
are?
1. more people 2.O.K. (9.missing) ____ (39)
22. Overall, during the past two years, would you say that your
neighborhood has become a better place to live, has gotten worse, or
I S  about the same as it used to be?
1.better 2.same 3.worse (9.missing)  (41)
23. All things considered, what do you think the neighborhood will be 
like two years from now? Will it be a better place to live, will it 
have gotten worse, or will it be about the same as it is now?
1.better 2.same 3.worse (9.missing)  (43)
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PERSONAL RELATIONS
In this next section, I'd like to ask you just five questions about 
some of the specific people you know, at least close enough to call by 
name. I need the full name. We ' re not concerned with who the people 
are, but we have to keep track and often people have the same or 
similar names. We put this information into the computer by numbers 
and we destroy the names themselves to insure your confidentiality.
No one will ever see the names themselves.
Interviewer Instructions: Get the full name as far as R knows it.
If R OBJECTS OR HESITATES: These are just standard survey items; we 
destroy the actual names and use numbers so no one can be identified. 
I'm just asking for names in order to keep things straight. All this 
information is just converted into numbers and we don't keep the names 
once we do that. We're trying to find, out whether people know people 
in the neighborhood or outside it. TRY TWICE FOR FULL NAMES: IF R 
continues to refuse, ask for first names only.
Important: WRITE DOWN THE NAMES ON THE LEFT ON THE MATRIX and MAKE A 
CHECK IN THE COLUMN FOR ALL QUESTIONS WHERE THE NAME IS GIVEN. But if 
R has already given you the name, check the column for that question 
and don't write it down again.
NAME QUESTIONS
(1) From time to time, people discuss important matters with other 
people. Looking back over the last six months - who are the people 
with whom you discussed matters important to you?
(Write down each name and make a check mark in column 1. If less than 
5 names mentioned, probe anyone else? Only record first five names.)
IA) Are any of these people relatives?
(make check mark in column la)
IB) Do any of these people live in the Midtown area?
(check column lb)
(2) Just counting the adults, who are the people that normally live in 
this household? Just give me their first £ last names.
By adult I mean 16 and over. ((make check mark in column 2))
(3) Not including the people who live here, what adult relatives do 
you or your husband/wife have in the Midtown area.
Just give me their first & last names.
((make check mark in column 3))
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(4) Are there any people in the Midtown area that you would consider 
friends or close personal acquaintances? What are their names?
((make check mark in column 4))
((IF P asks about "friends", say use your own definition))
(5) How about in the Baton Rouge area (but outside the Midtown area) . 
Are there any you would consider friends or close personal 
acquaintances? What are their names?
((make check mark in column 5)}
In answer to these last questions, you gave me the names of some of 
the people you know. Now I'd like to get a little more information 
about them.
Interviewer: WRITE JUST THE FIRST NAMES IN BLOCK LETTERS ON SEPARATE 
SHEET HAND the list of first names TO R .
Make CHECK MARKS ON THE MATRIX WHILE R. LOOKS AT THE LIST OF FIRST 
NAMES.
a & b) Please tell me the Sex and Race of the people on the list.
((IF ASKED WHY WE WANT TO KNOW, explain that we want to find out 
whether people know others with a different sex or background than 
themselves.))
c) Which of the people on this list do you feel especially close to? 
Just give me the first names of the people.
d) Not counting the people who live here, is there anyone on the list 
you have dropped in on for a chat during the past few months, or 
anyone who has dropped by on you for a casual visit? Just give me the 
first names.
e) Not counting the people who live here, is there anyone on the list 
you have invited over to your home during the past few months, or 
anyone who has invited you over to their home? Again, just the first 
names.
f) Not counting the people who live here, which people on this list do 
you ask to take care of your home when you're gone? For example, to 
watch the house, water plants, pick up the mail, or feed a pet, that 
type of thing.
g) How about anyone who asks you to take care of theirs?
h) How long have you known (NAME OF PERSON) in years?
ASK FOR EACH NAME: If "all my life", code 95.
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SECURITY
Now I'd like to ask some questions about safety, security, and local 
affairs.
24. Would you say you follow what's going on in local government and 
public affairs? 1. most of the time 2. some of the time
3. only now and then 4. hardly at all (9. missing)  (45)
25. Have you ever written or spoken to your metro council 
representative or some other local leader? 1. Yes 2. No
(9. missing)  (47)
26. Have you ever written a letter to the editor of the local 
newspaper?
1. Yes 2. No (9. missing)  (49)
27. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, 
Democrat, Independent or what?  (51)
1. Republican 2.Democrat 3. Independent 4. other
(9. missing)
28. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. 
If extremely liberal is point 1 and extremely conservative is point 7, 
where would you place yourself?    (53)
29. How much of the time would you say you trust the local government? 
1. most of the time 2. some of the time 3. almost never
(9.missing) ___ (55)
30. Are you registered to vote? l.Yes 2.No (9.missing) _____(57)
(IF NO, skip to question #37)
31. Did you vote in the tax election for the sheriffs department this 
past October 16th? 1. yes 2. no 3. don't remember
(9.missing) ___ (59)
32. IF YES: How did you vote? 1. in favor 2. against
3. did not vote 4. don't remember (9.missing)  (61)
If you remember, last year both the sheriff's department (Jan. 1992) 
and the city police department (July 1992) had elections that would 
have raised property taxes in order to provide more funding.
33. Did you vote in the sheriff's tax election in January of 1992?
1. Yes 2. No (9.missing) ____(63)
34. IF YES: How did you vote?
1. for 2. against 3. don't remember (9.missing) ___ (65)
35. Did you vote in the police department's tax election in July,
1992?
1. Yes 2. No (9.missing) ____(67)
36. IF YES: How did you vote?
1. for 2. against 3. don't remember (9.missing) ___ (69)
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37. Whether or not you registered or voted, do you support increased 
revenues to local law enforcement agencies?
1. Support strongly 2. Support somewhat
3. oppose somewhat 4. oppose strongly (9.missing) ____ (71)
38. In this area, is there any kind of local group, such as a 
homeowners' association, a block club, or any other sort of 
neighborhood organization?
l.Yes 2.No 3.don't know (9.missing) ___ (73)
39. What groups? (record names as respondent knows them, use back of 
sheet if necessary— PROBE: Anything else?) ____________________________
40. Have you ever been a member of the Midtown Association?
(IT NO, SKIP TO QUESTION §43} l.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ___(75)
41. If YES, have you ever contributed money to this program?
l.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ___ (77)
42. If YES, do you currentlv contribute money to this program?
l.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ____ (79)
43. On a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being totally ineffective and 10
being extremely effective, how effective is this program? _____
 (1 )
98. Haven't heard of the program 99. missing
44. Does this neighborhood have a neighborhood watch program?
(IF NO, SKIP TO QUESTION §45} l.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ____(3)
b. IF YES, do you participate in it? l.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ____ (5)
45. On a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being totally ineffective and 10 
being extremely effective, how effective is this program? _____
 (7)
98. Haven't heard of the program 99. missing
46. Many people have taken steps to protect themselves and their 
property from crime and criminals. Have you taken (or requested) any
of the following steps? (circle all that apply) These apply to you
and your family, not to things already on 
here.
the home when you came
a) INSTALLED AN ALARM SYSTEM Y N 9 ___(9)
b) INSTALLED DEAD BOLTS Y N 9 ___(11)
c) INSTALLED DOOR CHAINS Y N 9 ___(13)
d) INSTALLED SECURITY FENCES Y N 9 ___(15)
e) INSTALLED WINDOW LOCKS OR GRATES Y N 9 ___(17)
f) PITRCHASED WEAPONS Y N 9 ___(19)
g) PURCHASED A DOG FOR PROTECTION Y N 9 ___(21)
h) AVOIDED GOING OUT ALONE Y N 9 ___(23)
i) AVOIDED GOING OUT AT NIGHT Y N 9 ___(25)
j) AVOIDED CERTAIN PLACES IN THE CITY Y N 9 ___(27)
k) JOINED A COMMUNITY CRIME WATCH PROGRAM Y N 9 ___(29)
1) CARRIED A WEAPON OUTSIDE THE HOME Y N 9 (31)
m) REFUSED TO ANSWER THE DOOR Y N 9 ___(33)
n) INSTALLED OUTDOOR LIGHTING Y N 9 (35)
o) LEAVE LIGHTS/RADIO/TV ON WHEN YOU'RE GONE Y N 9 ___(37)
P) OTHER (Diease soecifv ) Y N 9 ___(39)
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47. Do you now personally own a gun of any kind? l.Yes 2.No
 (41)
(9.missing)
48. IP YES, did you acquire the gun for hunting, protection, both, or 
something else? 1. Hunting 2. Protection
3. both 4. other (9.missing)  (43)
49. Have you ever been threatened with a gun, or shot at?
l.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ___ (45)
50. In general, do you feel that the laws covering the sale of 
handguns should be made more strict, less strict, or kept the same as 
they are now.
l.more strict 2.the same 3.less strict (9.missing) ___ (47)
CRIME
HAND RESPONDENT CARD "B" WITH RESPONSES 1. very safe 2. fairly safe
3. not very safe 4. not safe at all (9. missing)
51. As far as crime is concerned, how safe do you feel personally? 
l.very safe 2.fairly safe 3.not very safe 4.not safe at all
(9.mussing)  (49)
52. Again, as far as crime is concerned, how safe do you feel this 
household is? 1. very safe 2. fairly safe 3. not very safe
4. not safe at all (9.missing)  (51)
53. Now about this neighborhood. How safe do you feel it is? 
l.very safe 2. fairly safe 3. not very safe 4. not safe at all
(9.missing)  (53)
54. How about the safety of Baton Rouge in general?
1. very safe 2. fairly safe 3. not very safe 4. not safe at all
(9.missing)  (55)
55. Is there any area right around here— that is, within a mile— where 
you would be afraid to walk alone at night?
l.Yes 2.No (9.missing)  (57)
56. Thinking about the neighborhoods in Baton Rouge, are there any you 
go out of your way to avoid driving through?
l.Yes 2.No (9.missing)  (59)
57. There's been a lot of talk about the murder rate in Baton Rouge 
this year? I'm going read a few things that might be responsible and 
ask your opinion:
HAND RESPONDENT CARD "C" WITH RESPONSES: 1. agree strongly
2. agree somewhat 3. disagree somewhat 4. disagree strongly
Homicide rates are high because:
a) There's a lot of poverty and misery in some areas of Baton Rouge.
1 2 3 4 9  (61)
b) Drug dealers are killing each other.  (63)
1 2 3 4 9
c) Innocent bystanders are being shot in drug wars.  (65)
1 2 3 4 9
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d) Violence within the home is increasing.  (67)
1 2 3 4 9
e) Guns are so easy to get hold of.  (69)
1 2 3 4 9
f) Most victims of murder in Baton Rouge are involved in drugs or 
crime.
1 2 3 4 9  (71)
g) Gambling will cause crime to increase.  (73)
1 2 3 4 9
h) If someone assaulted me, I could protect myself.  (75)
1 2 3 4 9
1 ) Even in my home. I'm not safe from people who want to take what I 
have.
1 2 3 4 9  (77)
j) I would be afraid if someone knocked on my door after dark and I
wasn't expecting anyone. 1 2  3 4 9  (1)
k) The courts in this area deal too harshly with criminals. ____(3)
1 2 3 4 9
1) The courts in this area are harder on blacks than they are on 
whites.
1 2 3 4 9 _(5)
m) Crime is the most important issue facing us right now. ____(7)
1 2 3 4 9
n) There is too much coverage of crime in the media right now. ___ (9)
1 2 3 4 9
o) I'm more afraid of violence than I am of getting things stolen.
 (11)
1 2 3 4 9
p) Gun ownership by ordinary people helps to prevent crime. ___ (13)
1 2 3 4 9
c) If guns are outlawed, only criminals will have guns.  (15)
1 2 3 4 9
r! Accidental deaths by guns are quite frequent.  (17)
1 2 3 4 9
58. There is a certain amount of crime in any neighborhood. What's 
your feeling about who's responsible for the crime around here? Is it 
most likely:
1. people who live here (that is, in this neighborhood)
2. people from other neighborhoods in Baton Rouge
3. people who aren't from Baton Rouge
(9. missing)  (19)
59. Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of 
murder? 1.favor death penalty 2.oppose death penalty
(9.missing) ___ (21)
60. Has a crime been committed against any of your property during the 
past two years? l.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ___ (23)
61. Have you been the victim of a violent crime (that is, against your 
person) during the past two years? l.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ___ (25)
62. IF YES, did you report this crime to the police?
l.Yes 2.No (9.missing) _____ (27)
63. Not including you, has anyone in this household been a victim of
crime in the past two years? l.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ____ (29)
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64. How many other people do you know in this neighborhood that have 
been crime victims in the past two years?
1. many 2. a few 3. none (9.missing) ___ (31)
65. Have you heard of Operation Takedown?
l.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ___ (33)
66. How often do you see the police in this neighborhood (not 
including private security patrols)?
1. often 2. some 3. almost never (9.missing) ___ (35)
67. Do you think the police pay more or less attention to this 
neighborhood than Baton Rouge as a whole?
1. more 2. same 3. less (9.missing) ___ (37)
HAND RESPONDENT CARD "C" WITH RESPONSES: 1. agree strongly
2. agree somewhat 3. disagree somewhat 4. disagree strongly
"These next questions are about the police and sheriff's office."
68. a) More money needs to be spent on law enforcement in order to 
reduce the incidence of crime. 1 2  3 4 9  (39)
b) The police and deputies generally do a good job in Baton Rouge.
 (41)
1 2 3 4 9
c) The police and deputies generally do a good job in this 
neighborhood.
1 2 3 4 9  (43)
d) It would be better if the same police officers patrolled this 
neighborhood all the time and people knew who they were. ____(45)
1 2 3 4 9
e) It would be better if the police were less involved in this 
neighborhood.
 (47)
1 2 3 4 9
f) It would be better if the police were more involved in this 
neighborhood, even if it took them a little longer to respond to 911 
calls.  (49)
1 2 3 4 9
g) The police are generally a nuisance around here.  (51)
1 2 3 4 9
h) The police act too aggressively toward the members of this 
community.
1 2 3 4 9  (53)
i) The police need to do more to get the drug dealers off the streets.
1 2 3 4 9  (55)
j) The police are too hard on blacks.  (57)
1 2 3 4 9
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ATTITUDES
69. In most places there are differences or conflicts between people. 
In your opinion, how much conflict or tension is there between (XX) in 
BR?
a. poor people and rich people  (59)
l.lots 2.some 3.very little (9.missing)
b. How about blacks and whites?  (61)
l.lots 2.some 3.very little (9.missing)
c. How about whites & Asians?  (63)
l.lots 2.some 3.very little (9.missing)
d. How about blacks & Asians?  (65)
l.lots 2.some 3.very little (9.missing)
70. Would you be willing to pay a tax to provide the following 
services for Baton Rouoe?
1. Yes 2. No (9.missing/don't know)
a) litter pick up and landscaping Y N 9  (67)
b) police patrols Y N 9  (69)
c) neighborhood schools Y N 9  (71)
d) extended day care Y N 9  (73)
71. Would you be willing to pay a tax to provide the following 
services if the service was provided for the Midtown neighborhood area 
alone?
I. Yes 2. No (9.missing/don't know)
a) litter pick up and landscaping Y N 9 ___(75)
b) police patrols Y N 9 ___(77)
c) neighborhood schools Y N 9 ___(79)
d) extended day care Y N 9 ___(1)
RACE
"Now I'd like to ask you some questions about relations between blacks 
and whites."
For each of the following tell me whether you 1. agree strongly
2. agree somewhat 3. disagree somewhat or 4. disagree strongly. (HAND 
RESPONDENT CARD "C")
72. a) The position of blacks has been improving in the past few 
years.
1 2 3 4 9_______________(3)
b) Most people would prefer to live in neighborhoods with people of 
their same race. 1 2 3 4 9 ___(5)
c) The government should not make any special effort to help 
minorities.
1 2 3 4 9_______________(7)
d) Most whites are afraid of blacks. ___(9)
1 2 3 4 9
e) Most blacks are afraid of whites. ___(11)
1 2 3 4 9
f) Blacks have too little influence in the life and politics of Baton 
Rouge. 1 2 3 4 9 ___(13)
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g) People have the right to refuse to sell their property to anyone
they choose, black or white.  (19)
1 2 3 4 9
73. Overall do you think that relations between blacks & whites in 
Baton Rouge for the past few years are:
1.improving 2.about the same 3.getting worse (9.missing) ___ (21)
74. Would you personally prefer to live in a neighborhood that is 
l.all white 2.mostly white 3.about half white and half black
4.mostly black 5.all black (9.missing) ___ (23)
75. Do you think that more black families will move into this 
neighborhood in the next few years? l.Yes 2.No
(9.missing) ___ (25)
BACKGROUND QUESTIONS
"Now, just a few background questions and we'll be done."
76. Are you 1. married 2. divorced 3. widowed 4. separated
5. single? (9.missing)  (27)
77. Last week were you 1. working full time 2. part time
3. going to school 4. keeping house 5. something else?
(9.missing)  (29)
78. If working, do you have more than one ]ob?
l.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ____(31)
79. About how much time do you spend at home during a typical weekday? 
l.most of the morning 2.most of the afternoon 3.most of the day
4. not much of the day 5. none of the day (9.missing) ____(33)
90. How about a typical weekend?
l.most of the morning 2.most of the afternoon 3.most of the day
4. not much of the day 5. none of the day (9.missing) ____(35)
81. Is there usually someone around the house during the day?
l.Yes 2.No (9.missing)  (37)
82. What kind of work do/did you do? ____________________________
PROBE: What is/was your job title.
IF RESPONDENT IS MARRIED:
83. What kind of work does your spouse do?
84. Which religious denomination do you most closely identify with?
1. Protestant 2. Catholic 3. Jewish 4. Other (9.missing) ___ (39)
85. About how often do you attend religious services—
1. almost every week 2.about once a month 3.once or twice a year 
4.less often than that? (9.missing)  (41)
86. Do you consider yourself mainly:
1. Asian 2. Black 3. Hispanic 4. White
5. Other 8. Don't know (9.missing)  (43)
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87. How many years of education did you receive?  (45-46)
  (total years, including grades through HS and college)
88. How many years of education did your spouse receive? _(48-49)
  (total years, including grades through HS and college)
89. How many of your children are in private school?__(51)
90. How many of your children are in public s c h o o l ? __(53)
91. What happens with your children are sick or on days when the kids
don't have school and you are unable to be there?
1. R. stays at home with children 2. spouse or partner stays with them
3. relative 4. neighbor or non-relative 5. child stays home alone
6. older brother or sister 7. organized day care program 
8. other (9.missing) _____________ (55)
92. If you were asked to use one of five names for your social class,
which would you say you belong in:
I. the lower class 2. the working class 3. the middle class
4. the upper middle class 5. the upper class? (9.missing) _(57)
93. So far as you and your family are concerned, would you say that
you are
1. pretty well satisfied with your present financial situation
2. more or less satisfied 3. not satisfied at all?(9.missing) ___ (59)
94. Thinking about your life as a whole, how happy would you say you
are these days—  l.very happy 2.pretty happy 3.pretty unhappy
4.very unhappy?
(9.missing)  (61)
95. Have you ever had to rely on food stamps or government assistance 
to make ends meet? l.Yes 2.No (9.missing)  (63)
96. Have others who live here ever had to rely on food stamps or 
government assistance to make ends meet?
l.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ___ (65)
97. In what year were you born?_____ 19__  (67)
98. (HAND CARD "D") Give me the number of the income group that 
includes your personal annual income before taxes. This figure 
includes all of vour income— wages, salaries, interest, dividends, 
(child support), and all other incomes. IF UNCERTAIN: What would be
your best guess? (CIRCLE THE NUMBER AND ENTER THE INCOME CODE BELOW)
1. under $ 3,000 this year
2. between $ 3,001 and $ 8,000
3. between $ 8,001 and $ 12,000
4. between $ 12,001 and $ 16,000
5. between $ 16,001 and $ 20,000
6. between $ 20,001 and $ 25,000
7. between $ 25,001 and $ 30,000
8. between $ 30,001 and $ 35,000
9. between $ 35,001 and $ 45,000
10. between $ 45,000 and $ 60,000
11. more than $ 60,000  (69-70)
99. missing
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99. Please give me the number of the income group that includes your 
family/household income before taxes. This figure should include all 
income— wages, salaries, interest, dividends, (child support), and all 
other incomes. IF UNCERTAIN : What would be your best guess?
1. under S 3,000 this year
2. between $ 3,001 and $ 8,000
3. between $ 8,001 and 5 12,000
4. between $ 12,001 and $ 16,000
5. between $ 16,001 and $ 20,000
6. between $ 20,001 and S 25,000
7. between 5 25,001 and $ 30,000
8. between 5 30,001 and 5 35,000
9. between $ 35,001 and $ 45,000
10. between $ 45,000 and $ 60,000
11. over $ 60,000  (72-73)
99. missing
END OF INTERVIEW
THANK RESPONDENT MANY TIMES OVER
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INTERVIEWER OBSERVATIONS
ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS YOURSELF AFTER THE INTERVIEW
100. Who did you talk to?
1. Male head of household
2. Female head of household  (75)
101. Respondent's race as you would guess it
1. White 2. Black 3. Asian 4. Hispanic 5. Other 
___(77)
102. Did you see any of the 
its grounds? (CODE ALL THAT
following in 
APPLY)
the respondent's home or on
a) burglar protection signs Y N ___(79)
b) alarms Y N ___(1)
c) barking dogs Y N ___(3)
d) many locks on the door Y N ___(5)
e) chain-link fence Y N ___(7)
f) grills on doors, windows Y N ___(9)
103. Did R have difficulty hearing the questions or understanding the 
questionnaire?
1. Hearing 2. Understanding 3. Both 4. No problems ___ (11)
104. What was the respondent's initial attitude about being 
interviewed?
l.very interested 2.somewhat interested 3.indifferent
4.somewhat reluctant 5.very reluctant 6.hard to tell ___ (13)
105. What was the respondent's attitude about giving both first and 
last names during the interview?
1. volunteered information easily 2. somewhat reluctant, but did 
not object 3. somewhat suspicious and objected at first, but then 
cooperated 4. refused to give full names 5. refused to give
even first names 6. didn't refuse but I thought s/he held back
 (15)
106. Was anyone else present during the interview?
1. Yes 2. No  (17)
107. Did respondent speak with a foreign accent?
1. Yes 2. No  (19)
108. Did the respondent have any obvious physical disabilities or
impairments, such as loss of limb, paralysis, facial disfigurement, 
serious speech problems, palsy, or the like?
1. Yes 2. No  (21)
109. Aside from what (he/she) said in answer to the specific 
questions, is it your impression that the respondent leads a very busy 
and active life; that (he/she) doesn't have much to do; or that 
(he/she) is about average.
1. leads active life 2. leads average life 3. inactive ___ (23)
110. How open and forthcoming do you think the respondent was about 
(his/her) feelings?
1. very open 2.held back somewhat 3.held back a great deal
 (25)
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111. Did you observe any signs of tension or stress in the 
respondent's behavior? l.Yes 2.No  (27)
112. Hew well kept up is the outside of the respondent's house and
yard/apartment building?
1. very attractive 2. well kept up 3. a bit worn down
4. very poorly kept up  (29)
113. How much activity--cars and/or people— was there on the street? 
1. a great deal 2. some 3. almost none  (31)
114. Was this a ?
1. single-family detached home
2. duplex
3. 2-8 unit apartments
4. trailer  (33)
115. YARD (circle all that apply)  (35)
1 = presence of a beer can or liquor bottle
2 = other litter or trash on lawn
3 = grass uncut
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C. Delmas. He is the son of John C. Kilburn, Sr. and 
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Kilburn began his graduate training at Louisiana State 
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research projects primarily under the supervision of Wesley 
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